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ABSTRACT
The ICSID has shifted the scope of investor-state disputes from domestic legal
systems to international law realm. It assigns regulatory disputes between states and
individuals to one-off private panels rather than public law courts. While investment
treaty arbitration (ITA) combines the form and procedure of commercial arbitration, it
performs under the substantive principles of public law. Since the ICSID does not set
out the substantive rules governing investment disputes, investment treaty tribunals
have constantly been the most dynamic zone of international investment law. Drawing
on the ICSID neoliberal orientation, tribunals have interpreted and applied the
substantive investment standards far beyond the consent of the treaty parties. They
have largely intruded into domestic matters that lie within the host state sovereign
authority. Moreover, they maintained a domestic normative scheme favourable to
foreign investment that obviously exceeds international minimum standards of
treatment. A minimal governmental regulatory action becomes an interference with
the use of foreign private property that amounts to compensatory expropriation. The
aim of this thesis is to reform investment treaty tribunals' law-making from within.
Remoulding ITA as public law adjudication, this thesis sets out a comparative public
law methodology for refining the content and scope of the open-ended standards for
investment protection. It draws on the customary rules of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties as a basis for interpreting investment treaty terms. This thesis
seeks to reconceptualise the objectives of ITA under the ICSID legal framework. It
emphasizes the correlation between investment protection and the host state's right to
economic development. Further, it integrates rules on corporate social responsibility
to equiponderate the host states' international responsibility vis-à-vis foreign
investors. Finally, this thesis points out to the significance of incorporating general
principles of law and judicial decisions as recognized sources of public international
law into the practice of ITA. It argues that accommodating the principle of
proportionality as a general principle of law in the tribunals' law-making process
would help draw the line between investment protection and state regulation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
– under the Washington Convention – has drastically transformed traditional
international arbitration from the reciprocal relationship to the regulatory sphere.1
Through a wide network of Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties (B/MITs),
individuals and multinational corporations are now able to directly initiate, arbitrate
and enforce international proceedings against sovereign states. In that capacity,
Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) acts as a fundamental legal tool of public
international law that reviews and adjudicates on states' exercise of public authority
vis-à-vis foreign investors.2 However, the lack of a multilateral legal framework on
the substantive standards of investment protection under the ICSID has invested oneoff investment treaty tribunals' extensive law-making powers.3
The absence of an effective mechanism to review inconsistent awards has led to
divergent approaches on a case-by-case-basis.4 Drawing on the ICSID neoliberal
orientation,

most

investment

treaty

tribunals

have

recognized

expansive

interpretations of open-ended treaty standards in favor of private transnational
investment. These interpretations give rise to legal instability in the practice of ICSID
tribunals. As a result of this, a large number of privately-minded awards have
diminished host states' legitimate regulatory power, maintained a domestic legal order
that fairly exceeds international minimum standards of treatment and deprived host
states the right to counterclaim against transgressor investors for breaches committed
in the course of their investment.5 In that sense, ICSID creates a one-sided model of
adjudication that seriously demands search for an alternative approach to strike a
balance between the interests of foreign investors and host state.
1

See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, March 18, 1965, U.N., World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx
(The convention is commonly known as the „ICSID Convention‟ or the 'Washington Convention')
(159 states have signed and 151 have ratified the ICSID Convention), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/
2
See Van Harten & Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative
Law, 17 EJIL, no. 1, 145-148 121-150, (2006)
3
See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92 MINN L.
REV. 191 161- 230, (2008)
4
Id. at 170
5
See supra note 2 at 127-131
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Over the past decade, respondent states discontent with ICSID's inclination to private
transnational investment has reached a climax. The expansionary interpretations of
central investment provisions by privately-contracted arbitrators have proved to be
detrimental to the legitimacy of the system at large.6 The lack of a conclusive basis for
states consent to the ICSID jurisdiction has cursed the practice of ITA with
unpredictability.7 Investment treaty tribunals have endorsed a restrictive approach that
relies on textual meaning in defining the scope of "protected investment", while
ignoring the main objective of ICSID in promoting host states' economic
development. In doing so, tribunals have intruded into matters of mere administrative
discretion that lie within the sovereign authority of the treaty parties. Inflexible
investment protection has vigorously contravened inherent regulatory functions of the
host states in pursuing legitimate policies essential to ensure public welfare.
Therefore, a significant part of the literature criticizes the current practice of
investment treaty tribunals for favoring multinational corporations at the expense of
the developing host states‟ socio-economic needs.8
It is evident that the global network of B/MITs creates an overarching body of
international investment regime.9 Yet, the vaguely-drafted investment treaty terms,
including Indirect Expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Most Favored
Nation, allow arbitrators wide leeway in reinterpreting the substantive rights of the
treaty parties. In many cases, despite similarities in facts and merits, investment treaty
tribunals have strikingly reached contradictory legal conclusions. Such divergent
practice touches fundamentally on the claims of systematic institutional bias of the
ICSID. Even though a judicial-like process was intended to disentangle the disputed
public and private interests in investor-state disputes, a neoliberal ideology has been
bestowed upon ICSID tribunals.10 An epistemic hegemony of commercial arbitrators

6

See Susan D. Franck, the Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. No. 73, 1521- 1625 (2005)
7
Id.
8
See MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER ET AL, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD
INVESTMENT LAW 25, 623-625, (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher) (2011)
9
Id.
10
See Gus Van Harten, Perceived bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in M. Waibel et al., 433-454,
(2010)
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over investment disputes has transformed ICSID into a multinational corporationsfriendly system of dispute settlement.11
Therefore, the development of international investment law as an autonomous regime
has come to a standstill since tribunals' interpretive approaches are no longer
supported by state practice. Despite the fact that the private law tendency provides
foreign investors with a high threshold of protection against unfair and discriminatory
treatment by the host state, it ultimately restrains the latter from exercising legitimate
regulatory powers in matters of public policy.12 In addition, it gives foreign investors
a means to penetrate into the host states' domestic sociopolitical scheme and influence
governmental choices. In fact, such penetration contradicts the principle of nonintervention at the heart of public international law. Furthermore, it challenges the
negative role of ITA in blocking essential policies in matters of common concern
including health, environment, human rights, finance and taxation.13
Since the early 1990s, innumerable arbitral awards worth billions of dollars have been
rendered. These costly damages have severely impacted the host states' capacity to
pursue developmental policies or implement social security programs. The precarious
practice of ITA has resulted in immense confusion on whether entering into BITs is
beneficial for developing economies, or it is detrimental for possibly resulting in large
sums of damages to already low-income host states with modest shares of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI); does ITA actually play a decisive role in the process of
economic development that justifies the surrender of sovereign immunity from
adjudication in return for the promise of FDI? This discrepancy has led many states to
renegotiate the terms of their B/MITs on much stricter provisions to come in line with
domestic social and economic programs.14
The chain of global economic crises in the 2000s has yielded a new generation of
BITs providing for more regulatory space in public law fields of action. A shift in
roles between inward and outward sources has resulted in the emergence of new
11

Id.
Id.
13
See supra note 6 at 1589-1590
14
For example, the India-U.S. 2012 model BIT has introduced major changes regarding the Investor‟s
scope of obligations most notably in paying taxes, fighting corruption and exhausting local remedies
before Administrative and judicial bodies.
12
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capital-exporting powers. New defences of state non-compensable measures have
been triggered before arbitral tribunals. The host states' backlash to the system pitfalls
has driven some investment treaty tribunals under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) to rediscover customary principles of international law in order
to balance between investment protection and state regulation, particularly in health
and environmental regulation. International law principle of sovereign independence
has been brought back to life in some NAFTAs' arbitrations. Nevertheless, such
semantic evolution is not equally reflected in ICSID's tribunals law-making.

Observing the regulatory nature of investment treaty disputes, some academics
highlight the importance of a public law approach in the process of interpreting
investment treaty terms.15 Yet, the jurisprudence on investment arbitration shows
meagre attempts to accommodate public law standards of review in investment treaty
arbitration. Instead of a substantive law reform, a major part of the literature on ITA
puts forward a number of institutional and procedural measures to address the current
fragmentation of the International Investment law.16 I believe that this path of reform
is contingent on either renegotiating the ICSID Convention or realizing a Multilateral
Agreement on International Investment (MAI) to replace the diverse network of
B/MITs. Despite being comprehensive, this reform seems infeasible due to the
ongoing conflict of interests between transnational corporations and host states.

Drawing on the public law foundation of ITA, this thesis adopts a pragmatic approach
based on the self-reformation of investment treaty tribunals. Thinking of ITA as a
public law adjudication may allow for remolding ICSID's tribunals' law-making
process to consider public law standards of judicial review. Even though investment
law scholarship rarely uses a comparative public law approach, I suggest it may offer
a promising avenue for reforming international investment law from within.

Against this background, in chapter I, I explore the legal hybridity of investment
treaty arbitration. I contend that ITA has two different phases that go hand-in-hand.
15

STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 1-36 (2nd
edition Oxford University Press) (2010)
16
Id.
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First, it involves the interplay between domestic and international jurisdiction.
Second, it entails a dichotomy between public and private interests in investment
disputes. Although ITA combines the form and procedure of commercial arbitration,
it performs under the substantive principles of public international law.
In chapter II, I scrutinize the current network of ITA under ICSID's legal framework.
In section one, I review the respective case law on the law-making process of
investment treaty tribunals. First, I appraise the attitude of different tribunals towards
variations in relevant investment treaty terms and whether the latter affect their final
legal reasoning. In section two, I critically examine the asymmetric jurisdictional
basis of ICSID in defining both the "protected investment" and the "protected
investor".
In section three, I briefly investigate the allegations of institutional bias through
evaluating the process of arbitral appointments under the ICSID legal system. Then, I
assess the lack of binding precedent and supervisory mechanism in light of the current
practice of ITA and whether such lack accounts for the fragmentation of international
investment law. Finally, I analyze the main approaches used by investment treaty
tribunals to define the concept of indirect expropriation and whether they respond to
state legitimate regulation.
In chapter III, I set out a three-pronged framework for reforming investment treaty
tribunal law-making. First, I lay out an interpretive approach for investment treaty
standards of treatment. To that effect, I draw on the customary rules of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as a basis for interpreting the substantive
rights of treaty parties. Building on the same line of argument, in section two, I rely
on the conceptual framework of the Washington Convention to firstly emphasize the
correlation between investment protection and the host state's right of economic
development as a main objective of ICSID, and secondly integrate rules on corporate
social responsibility to restore legal equilibrium between investment protection and
state regulation.
In section three, I point out to the significance of the general principles of law and
judicial decisions as recognized sources of public international law in reforming ITA
from within. Further, I argue for accommodating the principle of proportionality as a
5

general principle of law in investment treaty tribunals law-making. Finally, I propose
a proportionality analysis three-step test to delineate the boundary between
compensatory expropriation and non-compensatory state regulation.

6

II.

THE HYBRID NATURE OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

Foreign investors have always sought to protect their property rights and secure their
businesses against the sovereign powers of host states. Thus, they frequently relied on
the exercise of diplomatic protection by their home states.17 Yet, diplomatic
protection was dependent on the full discretionary power of the investor‟s home state,
regardless of the merits of a given dispute.18 This discretion had essentially implied
political, economic and most notably military considerations inter alia the investor‟s
home state and the host state.19 On the other side, domestic settlement of investment
disputes through the national legal system of the host state proved to be problematic
for foreign investors‟ interests. For that reason, investor-state arbitration was
envisaged in the first place to provide foreign investors with substantive legal
protection against the host-state's exercise of public authority.20
In harmony with its hybrid nature, Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) is formed by a
sovereign act whereby a host state voluntarily waives its sovereign immunity from
adjudication.21 Domestically, a state may consent to international investment
arbitration through enacting domestic investment legislation that recognizes
arbitration in future disputes with foreign investors operating on its territories.22
Consequently, national courts shall be suspended from exercising their territorial
jurisdiction over foreign investment disputes.23 On the international level, a state may
conclude Bilateral or Multilateral Investment Treaties (B/MITs) or join Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) which provide for investment arbitration before ICSID tribunals.
In that case, the investor‟s home state cannot subsequently claim diplomatic
protection over the dispute. This means that even though ITA is originally formulated
by a public law act, it proceeds as a private law model of dispute settlement.24

17

See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 5-7 (1st edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher) (2009)
18
Id.
19
Id. at 8-10
20
See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE RELEVANCE
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 1- 22, (2nd edition, Oxford University
Press) (2012)
21
Id.
22
Id. at 2-5
23
Id. at 10
24
Id.
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The ICSID does not constitute a permanent court for investment disputes in the
ordinary meaning of public international law. While interpreting B/MITs at issue,
ICSID panels make selective reference to customary rules of international law
applicable to investment including most notably rules of lex mercatoria. The mixed
role of public and private law appears more confusing when it comes to the
application of central investment standards within the merits of the dispute, namely,
the rights and obligations of both parties under an investment treaty. The ICSID's
inclination to private law is manifestly reflected in the practice of investment treaty
tribunals.25 Its ad hoc arbitral tribunals are made up of privately-appointed arbitrators
instead of tenured judges. In reviewing and adjudicating on states conducts vis-à-vis
foreign investors, they apply private law rules and procedures. Similar to commercial
arbitration, strict deference to principles of confidentiality and private autonomy
precludes third parties including interest groups, civil society or local communities
from having access to the arbitral proceedings.26 Whether the host state and the
investor have already agreed on the applicable law or not, there is always leeway for
the arbitral tribunal to draw on different interpretations in deciding the merits of the
case.

At this point, the paradox lies in how arbitral tribunals settle the tension between
domestic and international law jurisdiction. How do they assess public and private
law concerns; and how do they reach conclusions that reconcile equally the competing
interests of both the foreign investor and the host state. In this chapter, I argue that the
legal hybridity of ITA has two different phases that go hand-in-hand. It involves the
interaction between domestic and international jurisdiction since investor-state
disputes have been historically distributed among national courts, ad hoc tribunals and
claim commissions. Yet, the advent of the ICSID has somehow shifted the scope of
investor-state disputes from the host states domestic legal systems to the international
investment regime. In addition, investment treaty disputes concern a dichotomy
between public and private interests. That is to say, ITA decides on regulatory
disputes between sovereign states and private investors or corporations. As such,

25

Id.
Id. at 20

26
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ICSID tribunals constitute an alternative private method of adjudication to the public
law court system. In contravention of public law principles of sovereign independence
and non-intervention, one-off private international tribunal reviews, evaluates and
deters state authority from regulating its internal affairs in relation to foreign
investors. I analyse the two phases of hybridity in the following two sections.

A.

THE HISTORICAL INTERPLAY
JURISDICTION

BETWEEN

DOMESTIC

AND

INTERNATIONAL

In theory, investment treaty arbitration does not totally lie within the borders of
international jurisdiction; rather it lies at the intersection between both domestic and
international law. This is manifest in the parties, facts, rules and procedures of
investor-state disputes. Participants in the given relationship belong to two different
legal systems .i.e. the state as a subject of public international law and the foreign
investor whether an individual or corporation as a subject of domestic law.27 When
investors operate beyond their national borders, different legal regimes of hosting
states govern their private international investment. Thus, there is always a question
concerning which jurisdiction prevails. Does international law supersede domestic
law or vice versa? Do both jurisdictions apply at the same time under certain
limitations? The answer to these questions has never been the same; it constantly
changes in so far as political, economic and legal contours governing international
investment law change throughout history. In this section, I examine the evolution of
investor-state disputes before and after the establishment of ICSID.

1.

Calvo Doctrine: National Courts as “ex officio” Jurisdiction over
Investment Disputes

The current legal framework governing international investment law is an outcome of
various historical, political and economic forces. The legal status of alius including
foreign investors had been elevated from complete outlawry in the Middle Ages to
national treatment in the modern era.28 It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth

27

Id. at 2
See, supra note 17 at 4

28

9

centuries that states recognized aliens‟ rights to travel, live and trade in foreign
territories under non-discriminatory norms. The shift in the international practice
concerning the protection of foreigners coincided with the process of Western
commercial, political and military expansion in different regions, including Turkey,
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and other Central and Far Eastern Asian countries.29 Even
though Western foreigners were relatively subject to the domestic laws of the host
states, their properties were considered part of their home state's assets; and hence
were organised under special legal regimes. Accordingly, any mistreatment of
foreigners or expropriation of their properties in the host state constituted an injury to
the latter's home state itself.30
The correlation between foreigner‟s treatment abroad and the sovereignty of the home
state had given rise to the principle of diplomatic protection in the course of
transnational business. In 1924 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
recognized states' right to exercise diplomatic protection over their nationals for an
injury sustained as an elementary principle of international law.31 Although the
exercise of diplomatic protection had taken different forms mainly claim commissions
and ad hoc tribunals, coercive means of dispute settlement were frequently used by
the powerful Western states. Throughout the colonial era, powerful countries
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals and properties existing
within colonised areas. In most cases, extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised in the
form of military intervention, annexation of territories, friendships, capitulation
treaties or at best concession agreements.32 At the time, the use of force in the
exercise of diplomatic protection was not contravening the essence of international
law.33

29

Id. at 3-4
Id. at 5
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
"The evolution and exercise of diplomatic protection must be viewed in its historical context under
the colonial political and legal regimes; where diplomatic protection by powerful states was often
accompanied by 'gun-boat diplomacy'." See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, supra note 17
at 6-8
30
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several attempts to ensure the
pacific settlement of international disputes were carried out notably including the
Hague Convention I of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the
Hague Convention II of 1907 on the Limitations of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts and the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War. However, the powerful colonial states had persisted in using all possible
political, economic and military means to protect their interests abroad, impose
diplomatic protection and coercively recover awards.34 The Western socio-political
expansionism drove some states, particularly Latin American states,35 to adopt the
Calvo Doctrine in respect to protection of foreign investment. The doctrine first
emerged to resist the protective approach endorsed by the capital exporting countries
for the protection of their nationals' properties abroad through the extraterritorial
application of foreign regimes on host states.36

The Calvo Doctrine is based on two essential principles: the absolute equality of
foreigners with nationals and the non-intervention within the internal affairs of other
states. According to the Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo, the customary international
law principle of sovereign equality entails that foreigners must not be entitled to a
preferential standard of treatment other than the host state's nationals.37 The exercise
of diplomatic protection in its different forms undermines the political independence
and sovereign equality of the host state. Instead of the protective approach of
jurisdiction, the Calvo doctrine laid down a territorial approach based on sovereign
equality and national standard of treatment. Therefore, Calvo‟s territorial principle of
jurisdiction recognizes the absolute right of host states to delineate the boundaries of
their executive, legislative and judicial powers, decide on economic, social and
cultural matters of national concern and enforce their domestic laws and regulations
34
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on everyone within their territorial borders. Nonetheless, visitors and non-national
residents are variably excluded from certain rights and obligations inasmuch as the
nationality requirements dictate, such as having the right to vote, paying public tax
and enlisting in military service.38

Although the Calvo doctrine somehow succeeded in curtailing the abuses of
diplomatic protection through requiring the exhaustion of local remedies in host state,
it has never been elevated to the rank of a customary international law principle.39
State practice has clearly shown that the threat or the actual use of force remains a
legal means of diplomatic protection in the event a host state refuses to adhere to
arbitration or to enforce an award. Furthermore, powerful exporting countries
persisted in claiming the right to exercise diplomatic protection in order to apply their
laws to their nationals abroad.40 International jurisprudence on state responsibility for
injuries to aliens recognizes both a minimum standard of treatment that is accepted by
"civilized states" and satisfactory compensation in cases of expropriation of foreign
properties.41 Yet, diplomatic protection under the Calvo's territorial approach cannot
be invoked if any “available and effective local remedies” have not been exhausted
before the host state domestic legal system.42

2.

The ICSID System: A Unique Jurisdiction for Settlement of Investment
Disputes

The rift between capital exporting and capital importing states over the minimum
standards of treatment of foreign investment had widened during the process of
decolonization post-World War II (WWII).43 The newly independent states fiercely
claimed their right to either revise or annul the concession agreements that were
signed under the colonial rule. Most of the decolonized states adopted a socialist
economic approach towards private property in general and foreign investment in
particular. A systematic process of nationalization had taken place to transfer foreign
38
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40
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private assets of the economy to the public ownership of the newly independent
national state.44 Since 1938, states international responsibility to pay prompt and
adequate compensation for direct expropriation of foreign private properties was wellestablished under the Hull formula.45 However, in most instances, the process of
nationalization was effectuated in accordance with national protectionist laws, and
without appropriate compensation according to the Hall customary rule.46 In the same
vein, on December 1962, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) passed
Resolution no. 1803 on the "principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources". The resolution emphasizes the inherent right of states to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources; yet it asserts their international obligation to
pay appropriate compensation for expropriation of foreign properties and private
assets:47
[N]ationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.48
As a result of this, capital exporting countries have shifted their rights-based language
of private property and concession agreements to the notion of economic development
to keep up with the new international reality. The flood of capital that accompanied
the post-WWII reconstruction process stimulated a number of bilateral and
multilateral treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN).49 Although the
promotion of trade and the protection of investment were the primary objects of such
treaties, they also included provisions for economic development of the host states. In
1958, the signing of the New York Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral
44

Id.
It was first known in President Roosevelt's administration when the US Secretary of State, Cordel
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Awards (1958)50 marked a concrete step towards a transnational legal arrangement for
the settlement of investment disputes.51 It paved the way for the establishment of the
ICSID legal framework for investor-state arbitration in 1965.
a.

The ICSID as a Substitute for Two Divergent Dispute Resolution Systems,
International Diplomatic Protection and Domestic Court System

In the euphoria of decolonization, diplomatic protection, whether in its imperialistic
orientation or its legal form including state-to-state diplomacy, claim commissions
and ad hoc tribunals proved to be irresponsive to the nature of investment disputes.52
On the one hand, the right to exercise diplomatic protection used to be within the
absolute discretion of the investor‟s home state. Regardless of both the merits of the
claim and the amount of economic loss, the exercise of diplomatic protection on
behalf of foreign investment was entirely contingent on the political, economic and
most notably the military considerations between the claiming state and the host
state.53 Thus, foreign investors had no power to affect the claim-making process
relying on the international responsibility of states for injuries to aliens, unless the
home state so desired or a treaty/contract-based right to claim already existed.54

On the other hand, the Calvo effect on the nascent jurisprudence of investment law
has yielded the recognition of exhaustion of local remedies before national courts as a
requirement for the exercise of diplomatic protection.55 In that sense, if foreign
investors did not initially resort to domestic means of settlements in the host state, the
international responsibility of the latter for injury to foreign nationals may not be
invoked. Likewise, submission of investment disputes to the national legal systems of
the host states was always problematic for foreign investors‟ interests.56 In many
cases, such submission exposes the transnational private business to the risk of being
50
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at the mercy of the socio-political clashes between states. Furthermore, it leads
foreign investors towards immense legal uncertainty as they operate under different
legal regimes. Such uncertainty is continuous in the sense that it begins the moment a
business is first initiated abroad to the time a dispute may arise.57 In the latter case,
foreign investors are in many events deprived of an access to impartial tribunal to
settle upon their dispute. In fact, this is due to the lack of essential expertise to resolve
cross-border investment disputes at the national level as well as the direct affiliation
of national administrative and judicial arrangements to the governmental authority of
the host state.58 The latter, being a part to the dispute59 renders domestic dispute
resolution including national courts to fall far short of fairness and consequently
become vulnerable to politicization.60 This tangled relationship between private
international investment on the one hand, and host states on the other has highlighted
the need for transnational governing arrangements at domestic, regional and
international levels, particularly in the areas of dispute resolution.61

In 1965, the establishment of the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) was a turning-point in the evolution of international investment
law.62 It was first proposed by the World Bank to overcome the drawbacks of
investment dispute settlement under both diplomatic protection and domestic court
systems. ICSID provides a legal framework for the settlement of investment disputes
arising between contracting states and investors who are nationals of other contracting
states.63 It purportedly offers an impartial legal and institutional framework which
aims for protecting transnational businesses as well as promoting economic
development of the contracting states.64 For such common ends, ICSID delocalises
investor-state disputes through making them subject only to the ICSID's resolution
system. As soon as the parties consent to the ICSID jurisdiction, other local remedies
57
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are supposed to be excluded,65 unless otherwise agreed by the parties.66 Once a claim
is initiated before the ICSID, the investor‟s home state cannot exercise diplomatic
protection, nor can the latter's national courts review or adjudicate the given dispute.67
If the respondent state consents to the ICSID jurisdiction whether through treaty or
contractual obligation, its consent cannot be withdrawn unilaterally68 or even
conditioned on any additional requirements such as the exhaustion of local remedies
before domestic arrangements, unless explicitly agreed by the parties.69 Practically
speaking, this legal structure clearly transforms the scope of protection for private
international investment from a mere privilege under diplomatic protection to a
substantive right under the ICSID framework.
b.

The ICSID as an Exception to State Sovereign Immunity from
Adjudication

The ICSID Convention is a product of the reshaping of the international investment
regime in the wake of the postcolonial upheavals. Developing states took advantage
of their grander number in the United Nations (UN) to reconstruct the international
rules on foreign investment on the basis of economic justice.70 Their collective effort
under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)71 has
shifted the focus of investment law towards international economic development.72
65
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Capital-exporting states have departed from the language of private property to the
protection of transnational investment as a means to economic development of states.
This notion is evident in the very first paragraph of the ICSID Convention Preamble
which reads: “Considering the need for international cooperation for economic
development, and the role of private international investment therein.”73 Thus, the
protection of foreign investment is no longer reduced to state responsibility for
injuries to aliens on its territory, rather it becomes an object for promoting free trade
and economic development among contracting states. This semantic evolution in the
international investment regime has supposedly motivated most of developing states
to ratify the ICSID convention with the aim of attracting Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) to their nascent economies.74

Nevertheless, prima facie ratification is not sufficient for a host state to abide by the
ICSID jurisdiction since the latter makes the agreement to arbitrate an investor-state
dispute before its panels a parallel obligation.75 Theoretically, a contracting state‟s
international responsibility may not be invoked unless it has formerly concluded
B/MITs or an investment agreement that endorses the ICSID jurisdiction over future
disputes with an investor of another contracting state.76 In that capacity, ITA acts as a
unique adjudicative tool of public international law that governs the relationship
between states and foreign investors through reviewing and adjudicating the former
sovereign acts over its territory vis-à-vis foreign investors or corporations.77
Therefore, ICSID does not tolerate arbitration unless the respondent state, as a
sovereign party to the dispute, has in advance waived its sovereign immunity from
adjudication. In this respect, ITA is genuinely distinguished from both commercial
and contract-based investment arbitrations as they concern a state's private rather than
public act within the international commercial sphere.78 This is due to the fact that
state private acts under international commercial contracts are justiciable according to

73

See supra note 1
See MOHAMED A. ISMAIL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: LESSONS FROM
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MENA REGION, 84-85, (1st edition, Ashgate Publisher) (2013)
75
Id. at 79-84
76
Id.
77
See supra note 1 at 121-150
78
Id. at 125-127
74

17

the restrictive doctrine of state immunity.79 To the contrary, customary international
law on sovereign independence of states renders states regulatory acts within their
territorial borders immune from the international forms of adjudication.80 These
regulatory acts encompass state executive, legislative and judicial conduct.81

The fundamental plea of state immunity from suit extends either to foreign domestic
courts of other states or international tribunals like that of the ICSID.82 Under
customary international law, foras other than those of the state in whose territories the
investment dispute arise are legally barred from reviewing the latter‟s public acts.83
Although modern international practice has broadened the criteria upon which the
waiver of state immunity from adjudication may be given, still "three substantial
conditions" must be met for state consent to the ICSID jurisdiction.84 First, the
consent to waive state immunity must be given directly by the beneficiary state itself,
and not by any of its affiliated agencies; second, the consent must be explicit and
unequivocal pursuant to an international treaty; third, the consent to waive state
immunity from adjudication must not affect state immunity from execution or
enforcement under international law.85 In fact, the distinction between the plea of state
immunity from adjudication and that of execution or enforcement justifies the
recognition of compensation as the only form of reparation under the ICSID
Convention.86 The waiver of immunity from adjudication may be expressed by the
respondent state either in the form of a self-standing offer contained in an
international B/MIT or in a subsequent compromis d’arbitrage. Once given, ICSID
claims its exclusive jurisdiction over an investment dispute; and hence the dispute
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must be arbitrated without interference from any domestic political or judicial organs
of either the host state or the home state.

B.

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

In the ordinary course of events, states' regulatory disputes fall within the ambit of
public law adjudication, i.e. domestic courts of law as part of the state governing
authority. However, this is not the case with ITA where sovereign acts of states are
adjudicated by ICSID's private international tribunals. In fact, ITA combines public
and private law features into a single dispute resolution system. The mixed publicprivate structure of ITA may be traced back to the evolution of the classical form of
international arbitration from commercial transactions to regulatory conducts. Even
though ITA is primarily formed by a public act of a state, it performs as a private
model of adjudication. Unlike other form of international arbitration, it involves a
regulatory relationship between a sovereign party – a host state – and a private party –
a foreign investor.

In practice, ITA reviews, assesses and adjudicates on states' regulatory conducts vis-àvis foreign investors' private interests. In this way, ITA has a dual effect on host
states. In view of its high punitive damages, it offers foreign investors a coercive tool
to deter host state's regulatory acts in relation to their private interests. Furthermore, it
allows foreign investors a means to undermine prospective governmental policies
through the threat of initiating arbitration proceedings. According to the UNCTAD, a
large number of investor-state disputes have been amicably settled upon mutual
compromises through out-of-court arrangements between foreign investors and host
states.87 It has been reported that these settlements frequently involve drastic
economic concessions given by respondent host states in return for ceasing arbitral
proceedings.88
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1.

The Public Law Foundation: Investment Treaty Arbitration as
Regulatory Adjudication

The advent of the ICSID has strikingly extended the private model of international
arbitration into the regulatory sphere. Despite the fact that the New York
Convention89 and the UNCITRAL Model law on International Arbitration90 combined
together the form of international arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution, its
scope of application was confined only to commercial disputes between juridicallyequal parties.91 This embraces both state-to-state and private individuals/corporations
disputes where the parties to the dispute have the same legal standing. Under classical
international law, claims of international responsibility may only be brought among
states as subjects of public international law.92 Even in cases where injuries are
directed towards aliens, claims of international responsibility used to be initiated
exclusively by the investor‟s home state against the host state through diplomatic
channels.93
Private individuals had no direct power in the claim-making process due to the lack of
jurisdiction rationae personae under customary international law.94 Only sovereign
states had discretion to claim international responsibility on behalf of their aliens
abroad. It was not until the establishment of ICSID that individual investors and
transnational corporations have been given direct access to international tribunals to
initiate and enforce international claims in their own right against host states. Thus,
ICSID has turned into a unique jurisdiction to private transnational investments. From
this point, international investment arbitration transformed from reciprocal to
regulatory
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individual/corporation. These regulatory disputes were originally to be adjudicated by
the host state's national courts in accordance with its municipal laws.95
a.

Analogy to Domestic Judicial review of Administrative Actions

Van Harten and Loughlin aptly suggest that ITA offers an alternative dispute
resolution system akin to domestic administrative courts of states.96 Indeed, article 1
(2) of the ICSID convention is an embodiment of "global administrative law"; it states
that “The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and
arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other
Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” The
function of ITA under the ICSID legal framework in reviewing and adjudicating
states' regulatory conduct vis-a-vis foreign investors is quite analogous to the
domestic administrative courts of states.97 First and foremost, general consent of
states to ICSID jurisdiction whether through investment contracts, national
legislations or B/MITs, has converted ITA into a "compulsory adjudicative
mechanism".98 Second, investors have the right to bring "direct individual claims"
before ICSID tribunals, especially that they are not obliged in most cases by the
customary limitation to exhaust local remedies in the host state.99 Third, since the
procedural enforcement of the New York Convention has been extended to the
Washington Convention, ICSID awards are legally enforceable vis-à-vis all state
parties and not subject to any subsequent domestic or international supervision.100
Finally and most seriously, ITA enables foreign investors to influence host state
policy choices through threats of initiation of arbitral proceedings.101
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This evolutionary shift from the reciprocal to the regulatory nature of disputes under
the ICSID jurisdiction has brought about a broader jurisdiction rationae materaie in
investment disputes. In this respect, article 25 (1) of the ICSID convention provides
that “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend [to any legal dispute] arising directly
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State.” The logical corollary of this article is that the scope of
application of ITA goes beyond the limits of private contractual relationships to cover
all host state regulatory conducts that may negatively affect foreign investors over its
territory.102 In contrast to commercial arbitration, ITA is not limited to private
reciprocal disputes, rather it encompasses all governmental actions against foreign
investors regardless of their private or public nature.

b.

ICSID Tribunals' Variable Scope of Review

ICSID investment tribunal's scope of review is not the same in all case. It may vary
depending on the nature of the legal instrument sanctioning investor-state arbitration.
In this regard, three scenarios are contemplated. If the ICSID jurisdiction is triggered
only by an investment contract where state consent is expressed by a private rather
than a public act, the authority of the arbitral tribunal will be limited to such
contractual relationship. In this case, the host state‟s exercise of public authority over
the foreign investor will be assessed in light of the given contractual provisions.103 On
a different account, if the ICSID jurisdiction is invoked through a sovereign act in the
form of national legislation or international B/MIT (which is the focus of this study),
the authority of the arbitral tribunal will be extended to cover all state public conducts
vis-à-vis an investor regardless of their nature, whether public or private. In this event,
the scope of reviewability of state conduct includes acts and omissions undertaken by
any organ of the state irrespective of its functions, including executive, legislative and
judicial organs.104 Finally, it is worth mentioning that in many events the ICSID
102
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jurisdiction may be triggered through both private and public legal instruments; for
example, a contracting state may sign an investment contract with a foreign investor
with whom country it has already entered into a BIT. In this case, the investor's claim
may be based on either contractual or treaty term violation or both of them. Therefore,
the threshold of protection is far higher for such an investor since arbitral tribunals
frequently draw on the more preferential terms for an investment. Further, some
investment treaty tribunals elevate contractual provisions to the rank of treaty
obligations.105

2.

The Private Law Foundation: Investment Treaty Arbitration as Private
Model of Dispute Settlement

Arbitration has long been used to settle commercial disputes arising between private
parties. Since the early 1960s onwards, the practice of investor-state arbitration as an
alternative method of dispute settlement has materialised under various international
legal instruments;106 especially the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (1961)107, the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (1975)108 and most notably the UNCITRAL model law on
International Arbitration (1985).109 However, the scope of international arbitration
under these legal instruments was entirely limited to commercial acts of states within
the private law sphere. As a result, commercial arbitration was used in its classical
form to review only a state commercial conduct within a given contractual
relationship. The unusual function of ITA as a private law mechanism to resolve
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regulatory disputes inter alia, the state and foreign investors, first emerged under the
ICSID legal framework.110
Under ICSID's framework, states consent to a private international regime for
investment protection. By doing so, contracting states voluntarily grant foreign
investors and transnational corporations the right to arbitrate, initiate and enforce
international claims for injuries towards their assets or properties. A wide network of
roughly 3,000 bilateral treaties incorporates states' self-standing consent to ICSID's
private legal framework.111 To that effect, both commercial arbitration and ITA are
initiated through an individual claim made by a private party. Analogous to
international commercial arbitration, sovereign acts of a contracting state become
subject to a private panel of contracted-arbitrators rather than a public law court
system.112 Instead of a permanent court, one-off arbitral tribunals are in charge of
investor-state disputes. Privately appointed arbitrators as a substitute for state-tenured
judges undertake the process of settlement since the ICSID's Chair bestows
comprehensive jurisdiction upon an arbitral panel to settle a specific dispute on a
case-by-case basis.113

Investment arbitration under the ICSID legal framework transplants rules of
international commercial arbitration into regulatory disputes. On the one hand, ITA
cherishes the principle of the confidentiality of proceedings, being at the heart of
private law adjudication. This is evident in article 48 (5) of the ICSID Convention
which provides that “The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of
the parties”. Since the ICSID is not authorized to publish arbitral awards without the
consent of the concerned parties to the dispute, the latter may intend to block the legal
reasoning of ITA for political or economic considerations. Although the
overwhelming majority of ICSID decisions are published, It has been recently
reported that there are some other anonymous arbitral decisions that never been
reported due to the political sensitivity that surrounds investment disputes.114
110

See supra note 1
See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, (Dec 14, 1960), available at
http://www.oecd.org/
112
See supra note 2 at 140
113
See supra note 91 at 50
114
See Legal Information Institute, Cornell University. available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/
111

24

In conformity with the commercial practice, ITA raises the principle of party
autonomy over state sovereignty; hence the protection of transnational investment
prevails over public policy considerations such as health, environment and social
security. In practice, these considerations have nothing to do with the settlement of
investor-state disputes.115 Therefore, third parties other than the state and the foreign
investor including epistemic groups, civil society and local communities in the host
state are absolutely precluded from joining arbitration proceedings.116 As to the legal
remedy, ICSID recognizes compensation as the sole remedy in investor-state disputes.
Despite the fact that compensation equally applies as a public law remedy in the event
restitution seems to be impossible, it is still at the heart of private law remedies.117
Further, awarded damages in investor-state disputes are recovered in accordance with
the enforcement framework of international commercial arbitration under the New
York Convention.118

3.

Investment Treaty Arbitration as a One-Sided System of Litigation

The Preamble of the ICSID Convention states that “no Contracting State shall by the
mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its
consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to
conciliation or arbitration.”119 This provision was essentially formulated in deference
to the contracting states' sovereign immunity from adjudication under international
law. The Preamble is also supplemented by article 25 (1) which requires that the
parties consent in writing to the ICSID jurisdiction.120 Indeed, states, as sovereign
powers are at liberty to accept the ICSID jurisdiction depending on their legal,
political and economic standing. Yet, the interplay between national and international
jurisdiction along with the public-private structure that uniquely present in ITA has
considerably reflected in the prospects of investment disputes under the ICSID.121
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a.

An Individualized Claim-Making Process

Even though the ICSID Convention abstractly features both host states and foreign
investors bringing arbitration requests against each other, only foreign investors have
practical legal access to the ICSID litigation.122 In contrast to the reciprocal nature of
typical international arbitration, the ICSID legal framework creates a one-sided
system of international adjudication. Investor-state disputes constantly depict an
investor whether an individual or a corporation filing a claim against a host state on
the basis of an investment contract, an investment treaty or more commonly on both.
This is not to suggest that the Convention does not anticipate the host state other than
a respondent. Rather, the neoliberal mindset of the ICSID together with investment
tribunals law-making have developed a one-sided body of law that only allows
foreign investors to appear as claimant.123 Some private law practitioners have
justified this biased model of the claim-making process by the fact that the host state,
being sovereign, is the stronger party in investment disputes.124 It has comprehensive
customary powers over its territory whether in relation to nationals or aliens.125
Drawing on its political and economic influence, it may exercise unchecked
regulatory powers against foreign investors.126 For this reason, foreign investment
protection was the primary objective of the Washington Convention's drafters.
Moreover, it may be argued that sovereign states have various domestic legal avenues
of relief other than investment arbitration including domestic administrative and
judicial arrangements; consequently, the host state may internally pursue legal
proceedings on its own legitimate authority to have its rights sufficiently and
expediently fulfilled.127

On the contrary, I believe that it is the restrictive approach of most of arbitral tribunals
rather than the conceptual framework of the ICSID that diminishes the host states'
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substantive rights and accordingly gives rise to a biased claim-making process.
ICSID's arbitral tribunals tend to question the conduct of the host state more than that
of the investor regardless of the merits of the case. This inclination towards private
international investment produces a one-sided avenue of relief that foregrounds the
protection of foreign investment over public policy concerns of the host state;
especially in health, environment and human rights matters.128 In doing so, investment
tribunals employ an immense disciplinary influence over a state's legitimate
regulatory power. No doubt, the need for substantive legal protection for transnational
investment cannot be denied; yet, the right of the host state to counterclaim in an
international venue must not to be disputed under any circumstance. In interpreting
the parties' interests under ICSID's litigation, tribunals should account for the host
state's substantive right to development as perceived by the Washington
Convention.129 Further, they have to consider the state's countermeasure against
serious breaches committed in the course of an investment.130

In line with Van Harten's argument, I submit that the one-sided claim-making of ITA
renders it close to pubic administrative law review. Although the consent to ICSID
arbitration is no different than ordinary "offer and acceptance" in contract law, it
varies considerably in the practice of ITA under the ICSID legal framework.131 Once
a state has ratified the Washington Convention, its consent to ICSID jurisdiction may
be extrapolated from different domestic and international legal instruments. This
includes most notably a national legislation, investment contract or an international
treaty. It is such consent that forms a state outstanding offer and consequently gives
rise to recurrent arbitrations without legal privity.132 In Paulsson's view, this legal
privity is twofold. For one thing, it means that a foreign investor whether individual or
corporation, who is not a party to an international B/MIT with a host state, can avail
himself/herself of the latter's protection as long as his/her home country is a party to
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it.133 In this regard, the home state's international rights and obligation under the
investment treaty are transferred to its aliens. Another thing relates to the rationae
temoris of investment arbitration; that is "arbitration without privity" entails that even
investments that did not exist at time a given B/MIT was concluded may become a
subject of arbitration claims against the host state treaty party in the future.134
Therefore, investor's claim ipso facto establishes a legal acceptance that perfects a
host state self-standing offer to arbitrate included in a B/MIT. In all cases, ICSID's
tribunals have the competence to settle in their own jurisdiction any preliminary
objection made by either party to proceedings.135
b.

State Prospective Consent:

ICSID's case law endorses broad criteria in recognizing states' consent to its
jurisdiction. It draws on a variety of domestic and international legal instruments
including investment contracts, national investment laws and international B/MITs to
extract states' consent to ITA.136 In the case where a state's consent to ICSID
arbitration is contained in either a clause compromissoire in an investment contract or
a subsequent compromis d’arbitrage of an international treaty, the ICSID jurisdiction
is explicit and consequently will be deduced easily by a given arbitral tribunal.137
Such way of consent to ITA follows the exact means of consenting to traditional
commercial arbitration. However, the difficulty lies in cases where the state's consent
to ICSID arbitration is incorporated in either national legislation or B/MIT provision.
Although the requirement of "written consent" is seemingly fulfilled in the form of a
sovereign act whether a domestic law or an international treaty, the substance of
states' consent to arbitration remains implicit. In the meantime, this sort of state
consent constitutes the basis for the overwhelming majority of ICSID arbitrations
particularly when a foreign investor invokes customary rules of international law
applicable to the dispute such as Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Most
Favored Nation (MFN). According to 2016 ICSID caseload statistics, nearly 70% of
133
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investor-state disputes where the ICSID jurisdiction has been upheld were based on
either national investment legislation of the host state or a BIT provision.138
In the first scenario, a state unilateral act in the form of national investment legislation
contains the state's self-standing consent to ITA. The landmark Pyramids case SPP v.
Egypt139 marked such a development of state prospective consent.140 It was a turning
point in the practice of international investment law to establish the consent to
arbitration on a unilateral public act.141 Although Egypt as a party to the Washington
Convention had not entered into an investment contract with Mr Siag, nor had it
signed an ICSID arbitration agreement or compromis d’arbitrage, its binding consent
to the ICSID was found in article (8) of its National Investment Law no. 43 of
1974.142 While the arbitral tribunal held that SPP's consent is simply given through
filling out the arbitration claim, it has concluded as to Egypt's consent that “although
consent by written agreement is the usual method of submission to ICSID jurisdiction,
it can now be considered as established and not requiring further reasoning that such
consent can also be effected unilaterally by a contracting state.”143 In this case, the
interaction between international and domestic jurisdiction is quite evident in
establishing the ICSID jurisdiction. Whereas state consent was found in domestic
legislation, investor‟s consent was effectuated by a private law act invested in the
filling in of a written arbitration claim. In order to establish the ICSID jurisdiction, the
tribunal had employed an expansive treaty interpretation in light of both domestic
statutory provisions and international law that governs unilateral juridical acts.144
In the second scenario, the state prospective consent to the ICSID jurisdiction is
triggered only by a BIT clause. This sort of consent governs the current mainstream
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practice of ITA under ICSID's case law. The (1990) AAPL v. Sri Lanka145 was the
first case in which a state consent to ICSID arbitration has been solely found in a BIT.
It marked a serious shift in the basis of states' consent to the ICSID. Up to that time,
there had been few BITs compared to over the 3000 existing today.146 In an attempt to
assert the private law foundation of ITA, the tribunal concluded that "the BIT per se
does not contain the parties‟ agreement to arbitration; rather it contains the state offer
of consent to arbitration which has been perfected by the investor‟s subsequent
acceptance through filling an arbitration claim". Contrary to what stated by AAPL v.
Sri Lanka, one can perceive a dichotomous process for extracting the parties' consent
to arbitration in such a case. In this respect, the mixed Public-Private nature of ITA
comes into play. The first step involves a public act represented by a BIT arbitration
clause between the host state and the investor‟s national state which offers the host
state consent; the second step involves a private act epitomized in the acceptance of
the host state offer through filling in of an arbitration claim.147 Despite the fact that
the language of the Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT is pretty conclusive in expressing
the parties' consent to the ICSID jurisdiction,148 it contradicts article 25 of the
Convention which requires a "written consent". This expansive approach in
interpreting state‟s consent seems precarious in relation to the international principle
of sovereign independence; yet, for others with a privately oriented mind-set, it is
justified to some extent by the fact that ITA is a private international adjudicative
mechanism (if that can even be said).

Comparing the rationale of the two above-mentioned cases, it would be illogical if
investment treaty tribunals decided that a state is able to give its consent to
international arbitration through a unilateral municipal legislation, while few years
later the latter is held powerless to do so pursuant to international legal instruments.
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Nevertheless, this is not to justify these two expansive approaches in extrapolating a
state consent to ITA, nor to suggest that all BITs intrinsically serve as a state‟s
prospective consent to arbitration. There are still numerous BITs that contain instead
an ICSID arbitration clause explicitly requiring subsequent compromis d’arbitrage
between the parties. This narrow scope of interpretation did in fact prevail at the time
the convention was signed. ICSID's drafters themselves have incorporated such
approach of interpretation of state consent into the Convention Preamble and again in
article 25 (1).149 Despite the fact that a broad scope of interpretation to state consent is
in the foreign investor‟s best interest, it conversely brings up immense legal
uncertainty to the host state.150 Indeed, ITA is designed in the first place to protect
transnational investment as the weaker party over host state's territory, yet state
"subsequent written consent" to an international regulatory adjudication serves as a
guarantee for its sovereign independence.

C.

CONCLUSION:

In this chapter, I have explored the legal evolution of ITA from two different yet
interrelated dimensions: domestic and international jurisdiction and public and private
law. In section one, I have demonstrated how investor-state disputes do not lie in full
within the ambit of international law, rather they lie at the intersection between
domestic and international laws. The governing regime of investment disputes has
changed in so far as political, economic and legal contours of international investment
law evolved throughout history. Diplomatic protection proved to be irresponsive to
the nature of investment disputes; the notorious forms in which it was exercised by
the powerful exporting states have undermined the host states political independence
and sovereign equality. Although the Calvo Doctrine has partially succeeded in
curtailing the abuse of diplomatic protection through requiring the exhaustion of local
remedies in respondent states, it has never been elevated to the status of customary
international law. Likewise, deciding investment disputes through national court
systems puts private transnational business at risk of being denied justice or facing
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unspecialized or unfair domestic arrangements. It further exposes foreign investor's
interests to underlying socio-political clashes between states.
In section two, I have explained how the mixed public-private structure of ITA is
traced back to the evolution of the classical international arbitration from the
reciprocal relationship in "commercial transactions" to the regulatory relationship in
investor-state disputes. While ITA is primarily formed by a public act of a state, it
performs as a private model of dispute settlement under the ICSID. On the domestic
level, a state may consent to international investment arbitration through enacting
domestic investment legislation that allows arbitration in future disputes with
prospective foreign investors operating on its territories. On the international level, a
state may conclude B/MITs or join FTAs which provide for investment arbitration
before ICSID tribunals. In reviewing states' regulatory conduct vis-a-vis foreign
investors, I have analogized the function of ITA to the domestic judicial review of
administrative actions. In that sense, the ICSID legal framework constitutes an
alternative private method of adjudication to the public law court system;
nevertheless, investment treaty tribunals apply private law rules that originate in the
practice of international commercial arbitration.

In contrast to the reciprocal nature of typical international arbitration, the ICSID legal
framework creates a one-sided system of litigation that perceives investors only as
claimants. A one-off private international tribunal reviews, evaluates and adjudicates
state authority to regulate its internal affairs of public policy vis-a-vis foreign
investors. A considerable amount of case law shows broad criteria in recognizing
states consent to ICSID jurisdiction. Investment treaty tribunals draw on a variety of
domestic and international legal instruments to extract the contracting state consent to
arbitration. In sum, I argued that ITA combines the form and procedures of
international commercial arbitration, yet it performs under the substantive principles
of public law. In fact, regulatory disputes that govern the relationship between states
and private individuals essentially require the incorporation of public rather than
private law standards of review. Since ITA is formed by a sovereign act of a state by
which the latter voluntary waives its sovereign immunity from adjudication, it must
legally be reviewed as public law adjudication.
32

III.

PRIVATIZING
INVESTMENT
TREATY
ELEVATING INVESTMENT
PROTECTION
REGULATORY POWER

ARBITRATION:
OVER STATE

The legitimacy of the current network of ITA under the ICSID legal framework is
believed to be at stake.151 In addition to the precarious basis of consent to the ICSID
jurisdiction, as discussed in chapter one, the ICSID's neoliberal philosophy has
bolstered expansive interpretations of investment treaties at the expense of host state
regulatory power. This is due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework that
balances equally between the interests of investors and host-states, accounts for the
economic disparities between developed and developing countries and clearly sets up
the limits between investment protection and state regulatory functions.152 Whereas
the developed countries, being representatives of mainstream transnational business,
have long sought to maximize the scope of protection in favor of foreign investors,
developing countries strove for FDI flows side-by-side with securing their national
policies.153 Even though most of Investor-state arbitrations are concluded under the
legal framework of the ICSID, interpretations of central investment provisions
included therein have proven to be volatile and hence vulnerable to change on a caseby-case basis.154 This applies particularly with respect to the scope of minimum
standards of treatment including Most Favored Nation (MFN), Fair and Equitable
Treatment (FET), definition of protected investment, concept of indirect
expropriation, limits of investment guarantees in host state and provisions on
corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerning health, environment, labor and
taxation.155
International investment law has become plagued with uncertainty and fragmentation.
ICSID's neoliberal foundation has persisted in privatizing international investment
law through the broad law-making power of commercial arbitrators and private
international law firms.156 The legal framework of the Washington Convention
establishing the ICSID was vehemently criticized by a large number of academics and
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practitioners in the field for favoring inflexible investment protection to the detriment
of the host states‟ socio-economic scheme.157 Some scholars have attributed the
fragmentation of the international investment regime to the variation in treaty terms,
negotiating powers and the quality of legal expertise based on a state's political and
economic level of development.158 On the other side, the lack of a binding precedent
to govern the practice of ITA as well as an effective mechanism to review and correct
potential legal errors has largely generated many conflicting arbitral awards.159 Over
the past two decades, innumerable arbitral awards worth billions of dollars have been
rendered against middle and low-income states.160 The divergent practice of ITA has
ultimately folded into two principal solutions; namely, either to amend the
Washington Convention in order to accommodate host states' right to regulate along
with investment protection or to renegotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Foreign
Investment (MAI) to fairly considers the host states public law concerns.
Nevertheless, differences between developed and developing countries over both the
scope of the minimum standards of investment protection and the limits of states'
regulatory space have hindered any amendment to the Washington Convention.161
The failure of negotiations on a MAI to replace the current diverse network of BITs
has maintained the imprudent interpretations of ICSID investment treaty tribunals.
Moreover, applying extreme neoliberal policies has proven to be risky amid arduous
economic crises. Even developed countries have been forced to rethink their free
marked-based ideals for the sake of economic salvation and social security protection.
States practice' has witnessed a shift towards creating a safe space for exercising
regulatory power over economic functioning. Therefore, investment treaty tribunals
cannot further tolerate interpretations which are no longer supported by state practice.
The rising discrepancy among ICSID arbitral panels has led some developing
countries to renegotiate their BIT provisions on much stricter terms to be in line with
domestic social and economic policies. This tendency is evident in the practice of
157
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many middle and high-income developing states, especially with regards to financial,
labor, health and environmental fields of function.162 Other countries have managed to
initially limit their consent to the ICSID jurisdiction to avoid unpredictable claims.163
A third category of states have taken an extremist attitude towards ITA and decided to
opt out of the ICSID164 system altogether, rescind their investment treaties165 or to
challenge the ICSID arbitral awards through the available annulment procedures.166

A.

INTER-STATE BARGAIN OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY: DOES VARIATION IN
TREATY TERMS ACCOUNT FOR FRAGMENTATION OF INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION

Until the end of WWII, investment protection was subject to the power and
persuasion of states. The scope of protection for foreign investment was mainly
dependent on the political, economic and military influence of either the host state or
the investor‟s home state.167 In the wake of the postcolonial era, the schism between
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries over the minimum standards of
treatment for foreign investment forced the former to negotiate comprehensive BITs
so as to secure long-established interests over the latter‟s territories.168 Above all,
having a minimum standard of protection for foreign investment was a prerequisite
162
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for developed states to deploy more assets in the newly independent states. A salient
part of the literature on investment arbitration supports the view that term variations
over a diverse network of BITs have yielded an increasing number of inconsistent
arbitral awards and consequently accounts for fragmentation of the system at large.169
In this regard, I explain how bilateral investment treaties have developed an
overarching regime for the protection of private international investment. Further, I
evaluate the divergent approaches of investment treaty tribunals to the minimum
standards of treatment that included in different bilateral investment treaties.

1.

Bilateral Investment Treaties as a Normative Basis for International
Investment Regime

It was in the best interest of capital-exporting countries representing mainstream
transnational investment to establish a hegemonic model of investment protection.170
Under the neoliberal philosophy, bilateral treaties were seen as a substitute for both
the deceased gun-boat diplomacy and the implausible multilateral treaty on
transnational investment. This interest corresponded to the capital-importing
countries' aim to attract FDI essential for economic development.171 For such an end,
the latter were keen to convey positive messages to the former through entering into
comprehensive bilateral investment treaties.
In fact, these matching interests explain why BITs have historically developed in an
adverse order between developed and developing countries. On the other side, the
New International Economic Order Declaration (NIEO) has reinforced South-South
economic cooperation leading to the conclusion of numerous BITs among capitalimporting countries themselves.172 Oil explorations in North Africa and the Middle
East have driven many developing countries to sign BITs to assist their nascent oil
inter-trade.173 Besides, the industrial boom in South Eastern Asia has witnessed a
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significant diffusion of BITs amongst Far Eastern developing countries in order to
facilitate manufacture and technology transfer.174
All these factors have resulted in a considerable increase in the number of BITs
concluded between developing states from only 42 BITs in 1990 to over 1000 BITs in
force today.175 Being relatively recent, most of BITs concluded between developing
states were initially guided by the capital-exporting countries model investment
treaties. In particular, the U.S. was and still playing a prominent role in developing a
body of laws through updated model BITs.176 Thus, the interest in uniform rules on
investment protection came up along with neoliberal views that lead private
transnational businesses to gain access to domestic markets.
Over the time, there have been changes in BIT terms upon individual limitations.
Some states have adapted investment treaty language to their social, political and
cultural identity. Yet, such changes in BIT terms were always concerned with
generalities rather than details of minimum standards for investment protection.177
Thus, the continuing attempts to conclude a multilateral investment treaty have failed
because of the differences over the exceptions and not the principles of investment
protection.178 Arbitral tribunals have eventually decided on the substantive rights and
obligations of either party through interpretation. Nevertheless, the scope of
interpretation the tribunal may exert increases or decreases depending on the degree
of clarity and flexibility of treaty language.179
Although the treaty parties create their own investment treaty law, arbitral tribunals
are the supreme interpreters of when and how treaty term applies. Once the parties
recognize an investment treaty, they impliedly delegate comprehensive interpretive
power to the prospective arbitral tribunal. In that capacity, investment treaty tribunals
replace treaty parties as law-maker for the given investment treaty. In asserting its
law-making function, the tribunal in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine
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concluded that it has the exclusive competence to interpret the meaning of BIT terms
upon which it was entitled by the parties to settle the given dispute.180
Theoretically, arbitral tribunals as consensual adjudicative mechanisms are not
formally bound by the judicial rule of stare decisis.181 Even though arbitral awards are
not given the status of formal precedent, they are frequently relied on by investment
treaty tribunals. In practice, the use of precedent creates a body of case law that
applies independently from the governing treaty provisions.182 Even so, investment
treaty tribunals have in many occasions deviated from well-established precedents
drawing on certain legal reasoning underlying the tribunal‟s conviction instead of
treaty term variations.183
Before the advent of the ICSID, investment treaties provided at most for state-to-state
arbitration as an alternative to diplomatic protection.184 At that time investment
arbitration claims had not been individualized yet. Only states were parties to
international investment arbitrations. Dispute resolution was exercised through
submitting a treaty claim by a state party to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an
arbitral tribunal or ad hoc committee.185 Even after the emergence of the
individualized version of investment arbitration for the first time under the legal
framework of the Washington Convention, the ICSID jurisdiction had to be built on a
pre-existing investment contract inter alia, a foreign investor and a host state.186

It was not until the AAPL v. Sri Lanka award in 1990 that the pervasive network of
BITs became a comprehensive source of states' consent in investor-state treaty-based
arbitrations.187 In that way, customary international law on both lex merchatoria as
well as state responsibility for injuries to aliens was reflected in a vast network of
bilateral, multilateral and free trade agreements.188 In fact, this network forms the
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modern bulk of international law on foreign investment. It is impliedly understood
from article 42 of the ICSID Convention that BITs constitute the primary source of
international law on the protection of foreign investment against non-commercial
risks.189

2.

Divergent Interpretations of International Minimum Standards of
Treatment

One may suggest that quid pro quo bargains and relative negotiating powers of treaty
parties underlying the concept of BITs render the latter essentially variable in content
and structure. While some BITs may require negotiations between treaty parties,
exhaustion of local remedies or expiration of a grace period prior to submitting
arbitration claim, others may not require any prerequisites.190 Undeniably, BITs are
not identical, yet they form an overarching body of international standards governing
foreign investment.191 BITs have developed a striking convergent structure whether in
terms of language or objectives which advance the promotion and protection of
private transnational investment and the economic development of the host states.192
Drawing on standardized treaty terms, they typically contain provisions on nondiscrimination, prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation, Most Favored Nation
(MFN), Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), Free Transfer of Capital (FTC) and most
importantly arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution.193
Even when it comes to almost identical BIT terms, some arbitral tribunals have not
arrived at consistent legal reasoning. For instance, in CME Czech Republic B.V v. the
Czech Republic & Ronald S. Lauder v. the Czech Republic, despite the fact that both
tribunals were deciding on the same facts and merits under the same applicable
arbitration rules, they reached different interpretations of compensatory expropriation.
Whereas the former holds the Czech Republic liable for approximately U.S $ 270

189

See supra note 1
See supra note 173 at 20-22
191
See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, MULTILATERIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 65-67 (2nd
edition, Cambridge University Press) (2009)
192
Id.
193
See supra note 173
190

39

million in damage for breach to the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT,194 the latter
awarded no damages for lack of unlawful expropriatory activity under the Czech
Republic-United States BIT.195 Likewise, the question rises before arbitral tribunals
with respect to the application the “Umbrella Clause” in some BITs, and whether it
elevates a contractual breach to the level of a treaty violation. Two ICSID panels have
divergently applied the umbrella clause, despite clear textual similarity in the given
BITs.196 The tribunal in SGS v. Philippines upheld jurisdiction over the dispute on the
grounds that the Philippines contractual obligation to observe undertakings which
were entered into with SGS at the time the latter has first commenced its investment is
essentially covered by the treaty umbrella clause.197 In contrast, the tribunal in Salini
v. Jordan found that the umbrella clause does not apply to Jordan‟s contractual claim
at issue, and accordingly the tribunal dismissed jurisdiction over the claim.198
From international law perspective, BITs develop a normative basis for international
minimum standards of treatment. As Stephan Schill argues, they usher in an era of
multilateralized investment protection for private international investment.199 The
Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) as one of the key standards governing
investment protection provides the clearest example in this respect. The MFN clause
is frequently incorporated in most bilateral, multilateral, regional and sectorial
investment treaties in an unconditional and reciprocal form.200 The existence of MFN
clause in a BIT automatically extends the host state beneficial treatment that may be
given to third parties to the party of such BIT, particularly if the latter is treated less
favourably by the host state. Therefore, MFN clause does not only apply the
minimum standards for investment protection in a normative manner, but also
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multilateralize the access to BITs beneficial terms by foreign investor/investment.201
Nevertheless, jurisprudence on ITA shows divergent approaches to the application of
the MFN clause. This is manifest in the two ICSID conflicting awards, Maffezini v.
Spain and Palma v. Bulgaria.202 Whereas the Maffezini tribunal allowed the investor
to benefit from a more favorable dispute resolution system under the Spain-Chile
BIT,203 the Palma tribunal, relying on a restrictive approach to treaty terms, rejected
to extend the application of the MFA clause in the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT concerning
the dispute resolution clause to the other Bulgarian BIT.204

Moreover, the concept of "Corporate Structuring" similarly exemplifies the
multilaterization of international investment law through BITs. Corporate structuring
allows foreign investors to avail themselves of the protective regime of a third party
investment treaty.205 In the total absence of an investment treaty between the host
state and the investor‟s home state, ITA can be invoked under the ICSID jurisdiction
if the intended investor establishes an affiliation or subsidiary of his investment in a
third state which has already entered into an investment treaty with the respondent
host state.206 In fact, both the MFN clause and the corporate structuring best epitomize
the "depoliticization" of investor-state disputes through eliminating the state-to-state
power equation from the settlement process as central argument for the establishment
of the ICSID.207 I argue that the ICSID private law inclination inherently supports
legal solutions that mostly fit into the nature and structure of private transnational
investment rather than host states' regulatory functions.208 It is the arbitral tribunals‟
variable interpretations of key investment provisions rather than the variation in BIT
terms themselves that have brought about the “fragmentation” in the international
investment regime at large. Even though one can easily note variations among BIT
201
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terms, the effect of the latter has proven to be secondary to investment treaty tribunals'
interpretations in predicting outcomes of investor-state disputes.

B.

AN ASYMMETRIC BASIS
FRAMEWORK

OF

JURISDICTION

UNDER THE

ICSID LEGAL

Since the early 1990s, the growing number of BITs has formed the modern body of
international law on foreign investment. International minimum standards of
treatment have shifted from customary rules to treaty-based law. Yet, the deep
private-law-oriented framework of the ICSID has resulted in a diffusion of ITAs
through direct individualized claims.209 Paradoxically, neither the Preamble of the
ICSID Convention, nor do its conventional terms provide a comprehensive definition
of the "protected investment". Although the very first paragraph of the Preamble
clearly associates private international investment with the contracting states'
economic development, it does not elaborate on such association for the purpose of
ICSID's mainline jurisdiction. Thus, the convention leaves the matter of determining
the ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie to the given B/MITs as a first guess and the
interpretation of the intended investment treaty tribunal as a second guess. In light of
the vaguely drafted BIT terms, arbitrators have taken an expansive approach in
deciding what is qualified as a protected investment under the ICSID legal
framework.210

On the other hand, the ICSID jurisdictional basis rationae persona maintains a
normative legal order that favours Multinational Corporations (MNCs) whether on the
international or the domestic level.211 Considering the ICSID's costly proceedings,
developed countries' investors have a smooth access to its facilities and consequently
better chances of victory over developing countries' investors.212 In addition, domestic
investors and corporations are denied access to the ICSID for lacking jurisdiction
rationae personae under the latter's framework. They are deprived of any substantive
209
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legal protection on an equal footing with their foreign counterparts. As a result of that,
domestic investors are double-burdened under the ICSID legal framework. First, they
are entitled to a less preferential treatment than foreign investors and corporations.
Second, they do not have the choice to overshoot bureaucratic administrative and
judicial procedures to an alternative dispute settlement.

1.

Undefined Protected Investment: Investments Are Not Alike

For the purpose of the Washington Convention, an investment establishes the
jurisdiction rationae materaie of the ICSID. However, the Convention does not
provide a definition of "protected investment". As a threshold jurisdictional issue,
investment treaty tribunals have to primarily decide whether the substance of the
claim qualifies as an investment in the meaning of the Washington Convention as
well as the relevant B/MIT.213 Even though the Preamble of the ICSID does not
comprehensively define protected investment, it emphasizes the relationship between
the investment and the economic development of contracting host states. It reads as
follows: "Considering the need for international cooperation for economic
development, and the role of private international investment therein; bearing in mind
the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such
investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States."214
Thus, the Preamble requires that an investment contributes to the host state's
economic development in order to qualify as protected under the ICSID framework.
On the conventional level, chapter two of the convention entitled "jurisdiction of the
centre" does not assist at all in defining an investment. In this regard, article 25 (1)
states that "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State)
and a national of another Contracting State."215 This provision provides a broad
definition of protected investment, and hence transfers the burden of defining the
latter to the B/MITs on which the parties agree.
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Christoph Schreuer traces this jurisdictional lacuna whether partially in the Preamble
or fully in article 25 to the contracting parties contradicting views reflected in the
convention travaux preparatoires on the definition of protected investment.216 In spite
of the fact that the parameters set forth in most BITs on what constitutes an
investment are frequently similar, if not identical in term and content, they often
provide general conditions for qualifying an investment.217 This lack calls on
investment treaty tribunals to draw on customary rules of interpretation to define an
investment under the ICSID. In doing so, they have to essentially consider the ICSID
preamblar limitation as well as the BIT terms in question. 218 To the contrary,
investment arbitration jurisprudence denotes divergent approaches in deciding what
qualifies as protected investment. Investment treaty tribunals have broadly expanded
their law-making authority relying on the well-established procedural rule as
stipulated literally in article 41 of the Convention that "the tribunal shall be the judge
of its competence."219 Whereas some tribunals adopted an integrationist approach in
defining investment, others applied a restrictive definition to the preamblar text and
ignored the requirement on the contribution to the host state's economic development.
The practice of most arbitral tribunals is laid down by the earliest award Fedax NV v.
Republic of Venezuela (1998).220 The substance of the claim concerned promissory
notes signed by Venezuela and endorsed to Fedax. The tribunal accepted the
Venezuelan argument that Fedax had not made any foreign direct investment in
Venezuela and that it had indirectly acquired such promissory notes by way of a third
party endorsement. The tribunal upheld Venezuela's defense and dismissed the claim
for lack of direct investment made towards the host state's economic development.221
Four years later, by the same token the tribunal in Salini v. Morocco drew on an
integrationist approach of an investment,222 and further required an investment to have
four essential elements: a contribution of money or assets; a fixed duration; an
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element of risk; and a contribution to the host state‟s economic development.223
Clearly, the objective test in both Fedax and Salini is consistent with the customary
rules of international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT). In emphasizing the importance of the object and purpose under article 31 (1)
of the VCLT, the tribunal in Saluka concludes that "The protection of foreign
investments is not the sole aim of the treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside
the [overall aim] of encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying
the parties' economic relations."224 In Saluka, the tribunal not only acknowledges the
relationship between investment protection and the host state's level of economic
development, but also uplifts the latter as the "overall aim" of such a relationship.
Nevertheless, more recent investment jurisprudence denotes dissenting practice by
other investment treaty tribunals. In Victor Pey Casado & President Allende
Foundation v. The Republic of Chile,225 although the Tribunal referred to the four-part
test in qualifying an investment, it did not fully apply the latter.226 Indicating
ostensible deference to the VCLT interpretive guidelines, the tribunal argued that the
ICSID preamblar requirement on the contribution of an investment to the host state's
economic development is not an ipso facto condition for qualifying an investment;
rather it is a potential outcome of an investment. Accordingly, the Tribunal filtered
out the definition of investment from the fourth condition.227 More extreme words
were used by the Quiborax v. Bolivia tribunal in rejecting both Fedax and Salini
integrationist approach.228 In that meaning, the Quiborax tribunal concludes that “It is
true that the Preamble to the ICSID Convention mentions contribution to the
economic development of the host State. However, this reference is presented as a
consequence and not as a condition of the investment.”229
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In my view, both Victor Pey and Quiborax tribunals flagrantly contradict customary
international law rules of interpretation as stipulated in articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT which explicitly qualify the Preamble and the annexes as inherent parts of the
treaty text for the purposes of interpretation. Dissenting tribunals endorse a restrictive
approach that relies on mere textual meaning while ignores the object and purpose of
the treaty as embodied in the Preamble. The Convention travaux preparatoires
unequivocally show that developing states, in particular, first joined the ICSID with
the primary aim to withstand economic challenges and attract FDI flows for the sake
of economic development and public welfare.230 For such an end, states voluntarily
authorize foreign investments penetration into areas of public policy, entitle them to
minimum standards of treatment and waive their sovereign immunity from
adjudication so as to allow for alternative means of dispute settlement. In return for
this, foreign investment should abide by the host state's laws and regulations and
make substantial contribution in terms of value-added to the host state's economic
development.231

2.

Unequal Access to ICSID Tribunals: Multinational Investment versus
Domestic Investment

Modern international investment law has freed foreign investors from their home
state‟s discretion to exercise diplomatic protection through the individualized form of
claims.232 Yet, access to ITA under the current legal framework of the ICSID has
proven to be problematic for many investors whether on the international or domestic
levels. Several studies have criticized the scope of the ICSID jurisdiction rationae
personae as it only enables Multinational Corporations (MNCs) easy access to ITA.233
On the other hand, lesser concerns in the relevant literature, though significant in my
view, have been raised over excluding domestic investors from the international
minimum standards of treatment under the ICSID. I argue that this jurisdictional
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deficit strongly contravenes the well-established public law principles of procedural
fairness and equality which dictate that all parties to a given dispute must be granted
legal protection on an equal footing.
a.

Favouring Multinational Corporations over Individual Investors

Some commentators maintain that MNCs enjoy smooth access and better chances of
victory under the ICSID legal framework.234 The high degree of legal sophistication
and procedural complexity in the ICSID dispute resolution system places many
hurdles in front of the respondent developing states as well as their investors. In fact,
ICSID litigation requires the competing parties – corporations, individual investors
and host states – to be well-advised by reliable legal arbitrators, counsels and experts
throughout the proceedings.235 The respondent state has to have the adequate
analytical tools and econometric studies to assess its domestic investment policies in
light of the relevant international minimum standard of treatment. These instruments
are quintessential in either proving or disproving the negative impact on a given
foreign investment.236

Aside from legal expertise, developing states are double-burdened by the ICSID
lengthy proceedings that often last for years.237 Undoubtedly, the financial standing of
investment treaty parties may be reflected on the prospects of ITA. While developed
states endeavor to secure transnational protection for their MNCs, developing states
enter into BITs to primarily attract FDI to their modest economies. Thus, the latter
accept the former's standardized investment provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.238 Given the potential for large damages under the ICSID litigation, one may
suggest that ITA is a precarious dispute resolution system for developing countries.
The situation may be even worse if we consider the fact that the financial resources of

234

Id.
See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45, 611 604-665, Cornell International Law Journal
(2012)
236
Id. at 617-19
237
Id. at 611-14
238
Id.
235

47

some MNCs exceed the total GDP of some low and middle-income contracting states
of the ICSID.239

Recent empirical findings clearly support the view that the ICSID dispute resolution
system favours MNCs over developing host states. While low and middle-income
developing countries' share from Global FDI is around 10%, they are respondents in
the overwhelming majority of ITAs.240 According to the 2016 ICSID caseload
statistics, developing states have been involved in more than 70% of the total number
of investor-state arbitrations registered before the ICSID since 1972.241 Furthermore,
geographic distribution of cases surprisingly reveals that North American and
Western European states have been respondents in only 11 % of the ICSID investorstate disputes, while South American, African, and Middle Eastern Countries have
been subjected to roughly 50% of disputes.242

As a result of this private law inclination towards MNCs, the developing host states'
socio-economic rights appear to be severely undermined under the ICSID legal
framework for the sack of investment protection. In this regard, the 2010 UNCTAD
database on ITA reveals that the American-based MNCs are the most likely to take
developing states to ITA before ICSID tribunals; as the number of claims filed by
MNCs against developing host-states reached 93 claims compared to only 12 claims
filed by developing-states' corporations against the US.243 These data together with
the fact that the US share of global FDI exceeds the wholesale shares of the low and
middle income developing countries demonstrates that the developed states' MNCs
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enjoy a better legal standing under the ICSID framework than those of developed
counties do.244

Even though the ICSID bolsters the penetration of MNCs into public law matters such
as health, environment and taxation, it does not provide for relevant rules on corporate
social responsibility. Further, it does not even allow access to its proceedings by the
host state‟s affected individuals or groups.245 Oddly enough, an investor who seeks
fair and equitable treatment in the host state cannot be held accountable by the latter
for his transgression against the host state‟s population.246 Nevertheless, international
efforts have been made to bring corporate conduct under the rule of law.247 The NIEO
Declaration has moved to develop international law rules on corporate social
responsibility that consider host states' sovereign independence in the course of
transnational investment operations.248 In consequence, the 1977 UN Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations came out to comprehensively elaborate on
foreign investors‟ obligations in host states. Yet, it has never been put into force due
to the profound disagreements between developed and developing countries
concerning the scope of minimum standards of treatment for foreign investors.249
b.

Article

Excluding Domestic Investors from International Minimum Standards of
Treatment
25

(1)

of

the

Washington

Convention

excludes

domestic

investors/corporations from the substantive protection under the ICSID dispute
resolution system.250 In contrast to the comprehensive jurisdiction of other
international adjudicative bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights
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(ECHR), the ICSID jurisdiction rationae personae apply only to the foreign investors
of a contracting state.251 This means that the domestic investors are deprived from the
unique features of ITA. Whereas foreign investors are entitled to international
minimum standards of treatment, alternative dispute resolution system and direct
enforcement of arbitration claims, domestic investors are denied corresponding rights
over investment disputes. In that sense, domestic investors do not take advantage of
the deterrent function of ITA in reviewing and assessing state‟s unlawful conduct visà-vis private individuals and corporations (as illustrated in chapter one).252

In spite of the fact that domestic investors are operating on the national level, they do
not have equal access to the incentives and guarantees offered to foreign investors.
Instead, they are bound to deal with non-specialized domestic arrangements in
accordance with national policy stipulations which are often replaced by one-window
apparatus for foreign investors. While the latter benefit from both international and
domestic means of dispute settlement, domestic investors benefit only from domestic
means of dispute settlement.253 Accordingly, domestic investors do not have the
option of overshooting bureaucratic administrative and judicial proceedings.
Moreover, the ICSID legal framework not only saves transnational investment from
having resort to national courts system, but also from any "unilateral judicial action"
taken by the host state. In contrast to domestic legal systems, judicial actions may
constitute unlawful interference with an investment under international law. Finally,
investors are likely to be awarded far higher amounts of damages by ICSID arbitral
panels than the host state's national courts.254

In the ordinary course of means, state sovereign immunity from jurisdiction prevents
its national investors from bringing an action before international adjudicative fora.255
Further, host states think twice before exceptionally allowing a domestic investor
access to international Tribunals including ICSID's additional facility.256 Yet,
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economic and political consideration may accord better negotiating power to some
domestic

investors

through

either

contractual

or

treaty-based

investment

guarantees.257 For example, in concentrated economies, powerful investors may
attempt to manoeuvre through exerting economic pressure on the host state in order to
achieve an alternative dispute resolution.258 Contrariwise, in countries with
underdeveloped institutions, unofficial dispute resolution methods may frequently
include recourse to violence, political pressure or fraudulent practices against foreign
investors.259 However, it has been suggested that ITA has a secondary function on the
domestic level in promoting good governance particularly in developing states. It may
drive the host state towards improving domestic alternative means for settlement of
investment disputes whether in administrative or judicial form.260 In that view,
domestic investors will avail themselves of better policy making, minimum standards
of treatment, fair access to justice and consequently higher threshold of protection.

It is true that the deterrent function of ITA may to some extent lead host states to
develop preventive mechanisms for amicable settlement of investment disputes so as
to avoid exposure to costly damages under the ICSID. In that case, both international
and domestic investors will make use of it. The point does not lie with the existence
of an effective alternative dispute system on the national level; rather it lies with the
bargaining power of an investor to persuade the state to sit for an amicable settlement
in the first place and to negotiate decent terms in the second place. This is not an easy
task for a domestic investor compared to powerful MNCs that function on the
international plane. In sum, the current legal framework of the ICSID tends to grant
foreign investors far higher threshold of protection while excluding their domestic
counterparts from any substantive form of protection. Whereas the former can simply
rely on the Washington Convention, B/MITs, FTAs or at least an arbitration contract
in order to initiate compulsory arbitration against the host state, the latter are largely
shackled by sovereign immunity restrictions, administrative formalities and
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unspecialized national arrangements. This is unless a domestic investor or corporation
has in advance signed an arbitration agreement providing for investment
arbitration.261

C.

FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: DYNAMICS
INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS

OF

Aside from treaty term variations on the one hand, and the asymmetric basis of
jurisdiction on the other, investment treaty tribunals themselves tend to interpret
substantive standards of investment protection on a case-by-case basis. The lack of
binding precedent to govern the practice of ITA has yielded divergent interpretations
of central investment standards particularly on the application of indirect
expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
clauses.262 The absence of supervisory mechanisms to review and correct inconsistent
awards adds more fuel to the already fragmented international investment regime.
Jurisprudence on international investment law has failed to integrate a unified
doctrine on the protection of foreign investment. As a result of this failure, increasing
number of inconsistent arbitral awards worth billions of dollars in damages has been
rendered against host states.263 Therefore, many scholars have vehemently criticized
the current practice of investment treaty tribunals for elevating inflexible investment
protection over the socio-economic regulatory power of host states.264

The scope of international minimum standards of investment treatment has become
unrestrained in relation to the host state's regulatory space.265 The inconclusive basis
of states consent to the ICSID together with the imbalanced mainline jurisdiction has
cursed the practice of ITA with legal uncertainty. At a maximum point of public
disquiet, many countries have reconsidered their stances toward the ICSID system and
investment treaty arbitration at large. Most of developed and developing countries
have reacted to inflexible protection through either terminating or renegotiating their
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BITs in order to meet domestic social and economic needs.266 State regulation in
matters of public concern has been brought up in the new generation of B/MITs,
especially in finance, labor, health, environment and human rights fields.
Disinclination to accept controversial awards is also evident in the practice of some
states through making use of annulment procedures before the ICSID.267 In this
section, I briefly evaluate the process of institutional appointments under the ICSID
system. Then, I examine the lack of binding precedent and supervisory mechanism in
the practice of ITA as being sources of fragmentation in the international investment
regime. Finally, I set out relevant case law on the concept of expropriation with an
aim to appraise the different approaches used by investment treaty tribunals in order
to distinguish between compensatory expropriation and state lawful regulation.

1.

Institutional Appointments of Arbitrators under the ICSID Framework

Since the first case was registered in 1972, the ICSID has exercised control over the
appointment process of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committees. Some
empirical studies suggest that arbitrator/counsel-related variables are among the most
widely used models to predict investor-state disputes' outcomes.268 Up until 2015, less
than 20% of ICSID's arbitral appointments embrace nationals of developing
countries.269 Furthermore, the 2016 ICSID annual report notes that the same basis of
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appointment distribution is still applied by the Centre‟s Administrative Council.270 In
light of these findings, developed countries and their MNCs have a better legal
representation than developing host states in investor-state disputes. This biased
process of appointment has always been traced back to the high degree of
sophistication that requires certain academic and professional credentials for arbitral
appointments.271 Given the limited number of qualified arbitrators from developing
states, the appointment process would ultimately favour developed countries interests.
However, the lack of cultural diversity on the arbitral bench raises increasing
concerns over ICSID's private law inclination that enables developed states'
transnational businesses a smooth access to the Centre's facilities and consequently
higher chances of victory.272
According to the Washington Convention, the ICSID performs under the auspices of
the World Bank (WB). Both the ICSID's chair and the Administrative Council are
granted broad discretionary power in appointing arbitrators in investor-state disputes
under article 38 of the Convention. Thus, developing states have little, if any, freedom
regarding the selection of arbitrators in investment disputes.273 It is even disconcerting
to identify that the ICSID is affiliated to the WB, since the president of the latter is the
chair of the former. The conflicting interests manifest in the fact that the WB and the
Centre share almost the same contracting states, staff members, administrative bodies
as well as the headquarters. Most of the ICSID hearings are held in Washington, the
same seat as the WB, and if not, in other developed countries like Britain, France or
Germany.274 Furthermore, The WB as one of the global financial institutions that
supports free-market values funds the ICSID Secretariat General.275 A network of
appointed commercial arbitrators, private law firms and large financial institutions
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backed by developed states insist on fidelity to inflexible protection.276 It is enough
then to figure out that the ICSID neoliberal orientation favours private international
investment as embodied in MNCs over states' regulatory power.

The evidence also seems to suggest that a considerable number of assigned arbitrators
put up with the WB's free market economic solutions. International arbitrators and
lawyers who are engaged in investor-state disputes before the ICSID were already
absorbed in a commercial environment.277 Thus, they perceive ITA as a branch of
international commercial law rather than public international law.278 As I have argued
in chapter one, the form and procedure of investment arbitration has historically
evolved from the practice of commercial arbitration to investor-state arbitration. The
paradox lies here in the fact that commercial arbitrators are now operating in a
regulatory, rather than a commercial sphere. The legal contours of regulatory disputes
in which states public authority is involved are utterly different from commercial
relationships.279 In contrast to the public law principles of transparency, impartiality
and neutrality, the practice of ITA under the ICSID draws heavily on political
influence,

professional

patronage

and

sponsorship.280

Arbitrators

advance

expansionary interpretations that favor the financial stability of MNCs even at the
expense of public policy concerns such as environment protection and human rights.
These expansionary interpretations are deliberately sought to perfect the task of
investment treaties in protecting private transnational investment.281 Given the
neoliberal institutional context along with the commercial law background, a systemic
community of arbitrators, academics, lawyers, economists and commentators
interprets BITs far beyond the state parties' consent in promoting states' economic
development side-by-side with investment protection.
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2.

The Lack of Binding Precedent and Supervisory Mechanisms

Although ITA is a relatively novel method for the settlement of investment disputes, it
has developed a considerable amount of literature especially over the past two
decades.282 The establishment of the ICSID has stimulated the penetration of private
international investment into the host states' territories. Jurisprudence on ITA is
fundamentally built on the pervasive investment provisions as included in thousands
of B/MITs.283 Investment treaty terms have codified most of the customary
international rules on the minimum standards of treatment and the international
responsibility of states for injuries to aliens.284 But still, there is no multilateral legal
framework to define investment, settle on the scope of investment standards of
protection and account for the economic disparities between developed and
developing countries.285 The ICSID legal framework under the Washington
Convention does not set out the substantive rules governing the regulatory
relationship between foreign investors and host states. Thus, investment treaty
tribunals have been and remain the most dynamic zone of international investment
law. Since they have a dual effect on both private investment interests and publicpolicy-making, they presumably combine public and private international law rules
into a single dispute resolution system.286 Yet, the overlapping standpoints of both
private investment and host states have cursed the practice of investment treaty
tribunals with more divergence.287 Investment treaty tribunals have never balanced
between the host state‟s socio-economic rights and the protection of foreign investors
against non-commercial risk.288
Consistent with the general rule in public international adjudication,289 international
investment law does not recognize a rule of stare decisis. Article 53 (1) of the ICSID
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convention impliedly ignores the rule of legal precedent: "The award shall be binding
on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except
those provided for in this Convention." This means that investor-state disputes are to
be settled on a case-by-case basis with respect to particular facts and parties in a
specific context. Nevertheless, this is not to say that investment treaty tribunals
disregard precedent in full; rather they do rely on each other's decisions in supporting
their legal reasoning. International practice reveals that arbitral panels variably apply
legal precedent depending on the subject-matter in question whether inter-state
conflict, international trade, human rights or investment.290 The growing body of
investment treaty law that stems from a network of more than 3000 B/MITs was seen
as establishing a multilateral legal system on the minimum standards of investment
protection.291 However, the jurisprudence of investment treaty tribunals shows a
considerable amount of divergence rather than convergence. The lack of a binding
rule of stare decisis in the practice of ITA has compelled arbitral tribunals to draw on
variable textual interpretations for investment treaty standards.292 This includes most
notably, direct and indirect expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses. Paradoxically, investment treaty tribunals
sought to largely expand the scope of investment protection far beyond the treaty
parties' consent to its object and purpose. Even though most Investor-state treatybased arbitrations are undertaken under the ICSID legal framework, interpretations of
investment standards included therein are frequently divergent and subject to change
on a case-by-case basis. This discrepancy undermines the principles of legal stability
and consistency that should exist in any sound legal system and consequently
threatens the legitimacy of ITA.293
From my perspective, fragmentation of international investment law may be attributed
to two main reasons. First, Tribunals do not stick to the customary international law
rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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(VCLT).294 On the contrary, Investment treaty tribunals adopt a restrictive interpretive
approach which considers only the ordinary textual meaning of an investment treaty
while ignoring the treaty parties' consent. The second reason is that investment treaty
tribunals have never settled the public-private conflict between the host state‟s
regulatory power and the foreign investor‟s protection. I agree with Stephan Schill
that investment treaty tribunals do create international investment law through
precedent.295 However, the Washington Convention‟s travaux préparatoires supports
the view that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the ICSID arbitrations.296
One may suggest that some investment standards of treatment have relatively formed
an overarching applicable law in investor-state disputes. Drawing on the similarity of
BIT terms, Kaufmann-Kohler argues that investment treaty tribunals, in particular,
must be bound in their legal reasoning by the rule of precedent.297 In contrast to both
commercial and contract-based-investment tribunals, investment treaty tribunals form
a part of the international legal order and hence they are under a "moral obligation" to
follow precedent in their decisions.298 For example, MFN clauses in bilateral
investment treaties have played a significant role in bringing uniformity into
international investment standards of protection as previously illustrated in section
one. Nevertheless, MFN clause has never been elevated to the status of precedent.299
Sufficient evidence demonstrates that ICSID tribunals' law-making on international
investment standards of protection does not construct a coherent body of precedent.300
Instead, the frequent exceptions and derogation in the practice of investment treaty
tribunals is anathema that lends investor-state dispute settlement to unpredictable
outcomes.301
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In the course of Argentina's economic crisis,302 some tribunals that involve the same
facts and merits have adopted divergent approaches in making reference to earlier
ICSID arbitral awards.303 In this respect, I compare three ICSID awards that adopt
different approaches in deciding on the applicability of precedent to investor-state
disputes. The tribunal in AES Corporation v. Argentina not only took a negative
attitude towards precedent, but also acknowledged its contribution to the on-going
process of fragmentation. In very odd language, the AES tribunal stated that “each
tribunal remains [sovereign] and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, [a
different solution] for resolving the same problem."304 In the same year, using a
different approach while responding to a one party's claim arguing for departure from
earlier case law, the tribunal in Camuzzi v. Argentina adopted a positive approach
towards precedent by concluding that “the tribunal has no reason not to concur with
conclusion, even though some of the elements of facts in each dispute may differ in
some respect.”305 A more balanced approach in deciding on the applicability of
precedent to investor-state arbitration was endorsed by the tribunal in Daimler
Financial Service AG v. Argentine. In spite of acknowledging that there is no such
rule of stare decisis under international investment law, the tribunal concluded that
"Each case must be decided on the basis of the applicable treaty texts and in light of
the relevant facts… it is a fundamental principle of the rule of law that 'like cases
should be decided alike' unless a strong reason exists to distinguish the current case
from previous ones."306 It appears from this language that the Daimler Tribunal used
an investigative approach vis-a-vis "all alike cases" in order to ensure a minimum
degree of legal stability in its legal reasoning.307 This balanced approach is quite
302
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different from AES's clear departure from the concept of the rule of law on the one
hand and Camuzzi's disregard for the 'necessary evolution of the law on foreign
investment.
In light of these divergent interpretations of the scope of legal precedent in ITA,
central investment standards have been inconsistently applied by one-off investment
treaty tribunals. The absence of an appellate body to the institutional framework of the
ICSID has exacerbated legal inconsistency whether at the jurisdictional or substantive
level of ITA. As a result of this, more conflicting awards are expected to come out.308
In many legal systems, the concept of legal precedent is in some way attached to the
higher courts' judgments in final appeals. On the contrary, the lack of hierarchy
among arbitral tribunals in international investment law makes it impossible to pursue
such a concept of precedent.309 In my view, this fragmentation is essentially driven by
the private law inclination of most investment treaty tribunals towards the interests of
transnational foreign investment. The International Court of Justice as a form of
international adjudication enjoys a relative jurisprudence constant, though has no
formal rule of precedent.310 On the other side, annulment procedure under the ICSID
has reflected more illegitimacy in the process of investor state dispute settlement.
They have proven to be complex, costly and futile to many respondent states that
opted to contest ICSID awards.311 An independent adjudicative body would be
essential for reviewing and correcting possible inconsistent arbitral decisions. Indeed,
this body would inspire the legal conduct of the key actors in investor-state disputes
including

arbitrators,

international

lawyers,

economists

and

multinational

corporations. Finally, challenged awards would help create an international normative
order on the minimum standards of treatment for investment protection.312
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3.

Equating Indirect Expropriation with State Regulatory Measure: A
Threefold Formulation

The per se prohibition of non-compensatory expropriation of foreign investment is
well-established under customary rules of international law. Under the Hull formula,
states international responsibility to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation
for expropriating foreign assets is undisputed.313 The wide network of B/MITs314
virtually prohibits expropriation except in cases where it is taken for public purpose,
non-discriminatory, in accordance with due process of law and accompanied by
proportionate compensation.315 Since expropriation was attached to the dispossession
of private property owned by foreign investors in the aftermath of nationalisation, its
definition did not apply to a situation where a foreign investor is still holding the
alleged property. The proliferation of B/MITs after the advent of the ICSID has
rendered this classical form of direct expropriation rarely applicable.316 States' modern
practice of interference with the mere use of foreign investment without formal
transfer of title has driven the jurisprudence on ITA to reverse "the possession
paradigm" of expropriation to include other forms of indirect expropriatory conducts.
Indirect expropriation has been frequently applied where no material deprivation
resulting from the state public conduct, yet the use of an investment is negatively
impacted.317 This tendency is justified under most legal systems by the investor's right
to effective management and control as prerogatives to private ownership.318 Some
capital-importing states, such as China and India, have turned to be a source of
outward investment even to traditional exporting states. While developed states,
particularly under NAFTA, have reacted by taking protectionist regulatory measures
to protect people's health, environment and human rights, developing states managed
to lower standards of national protection so as to attract bigger share from FDI.319
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This shift in roles was reflected in the BITs boom in the 1990s through introducing a
third category of measures which are "tantamount to expropriation". The lack of clear
distinction between indirect expropriations and the new category of acts tantamount to
an expropriation in the overwhelming majority of BITs have provided the basis for an
expansionist approach to state regulatory acts in relation to foreign investors.320
This threefold formulation of state regulatory measures to direct, indirect and acts
tantamount to an expropriation has no comparable application in domestic law on
regulatory takings. It was primarily intended by drafters with neoliberal backgrounds
to construct a system of investment protection based on free market values and the
sanctity of private property.321 The lack of any distinction under BITs between
compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable state regulation has mostly
appeased the privately oriented commercial arbitrators and lawyers who aim to
amplify the legal cause of arbitration with a view to bolster their profitable industry.
Thinking of ITA as a form of commercial arbitration, most investment treaty tribunals
have taken the law of expropriation beyond the treaty object and purpose as consented
to by the treaty parties. A minimal governmental regulatory action becomes
interference with the use of foreign investment that amounts to an expropriation.322 In
interpreting and applying the vaguely drafted substantive standards of protection,
investment treaty tribunals assume a powerful quasi-legislative function.323 In doing
so, they intend to create a course of precedents on the international minimum standard
of treatment, especially on indirect expropriation, FET and MFN clauses. Whereas
some tribunals have ostensibly referred to the customary rules of interpretation under
the VCLT as a means to legitimize their expansive interpretations, others have
conversely used the latter's interpretive technics to derogate from previous
decisions.324
The existence of a third category of acts tantamount to takings without a precise
definition gives rise to legal instability and inconsistency in the practice of ITA.
Investment treaty tribunals have largely extended the applicability of indirect
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expropriation terms to almost all state regulatory measures. Thus, they maintain a
domestic normative scheme favourable to foreign investment that obviously exceeds
international minimum standards of treatment.325 The threefold formulation magnifies
the substantive principles of state responsibility to cover lawful regulatory actions
while leaving the state defenceless against foreign investors' transgressions.
Furthermore, opponent arbitrators' proposals to develop a counterclaim mechanism in
the practice of ITA as a means of distinction between indirect expropriation and
lawful regulation were ignored by ICSID arbitral panels.326 Instead of examining host
state's intention behind taking regulatory measures, arbitral tribunals have endorsed an
"all or nothing" paradigm that either grants investor full compensation or denies the
latter any kind of indemnification. ICSID case law indicates that even if a regulatory
measure is taken in the course of the state traditional role in advancing public welfare
with no intention to cause injury to an investor and do not contravene investment
legitimate expectations, it may invoke state responsibility for affecting the economic
value of an investment.327 In fact, the ambiguity of the requirements that establish
indirect expropriation in the first place makes it more problematic to differentiate the
latter from the newly introduced acts tantamount to takings in the second place. Under
this authority, two main doctrines have emerged in the jurisprudence of ITA to
distinguish compensatory expropriation from state lawful regulation.328
The "sole effect doctrine" is considered the founding form of the "all or nothing"
paradigm. The impact of a governmental measure on an investor is the sole factor
required for the occurrence of a compensable expropriation. This is regardless of
whether the regulatory measure is taken for attaining a public purpose such as health
or environment protection.329 In Metalclad v. Mexico, a US corporation alleged loss of
"an expected economic benefit" as a result of a Mexican municipality rejection of a
construction permit for a hazardous waste transfer landfill was deemed as sufficient
for establishing compensatory expropriation.330 The tribunal concluded that "covert or
325
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incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the
owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State."331 The Metalclad case is an outcome of the "tantamount clause" in newer
BITs. In my view, the Tribunal flagrantly undermines the principle of sovereign
independence of states which is at the heart of general international law. Such a
precarious approach does not only rely on inexistent factual evidence represented in
the alleged lost-opportunity, but also impedes state power to regulate matters of
public policy concern such as protecting its population from hazardous waste in the
present case. Although there was no imminent value depreciation which is an
essential requirement for compensatory expropriation, the tribunal relied on the
"tantamount" development to maintain a normative condition favourable to the
foreign investor in recovering compensation.
On the other hand, some Tribunals have used the "police power doctrine" to
distinguish between compensable expropriation and non-compensable regulatory
measure. The excessive reliance by foreign investors on the broad definition of
indirect expropriation to thwart state regulations has driven some recent tribunals to
develop a public purpose criterion. For such an end, they draw on a restrictive
approach which mainly focuses on the the nature rather than the impact of state
measure.332 For instance, in the NAFTA case, Methanex v. United States, the tribunal
held that the US. Executive order banning the use of 'MTBE' substance, which is used
as a fuel additive, for its serious threat to human health and environment is a lawful
regulatory measure; and accordingly the tribunal provided for no compensation.333 In
contrast to Metalclad, the Tribunal in Methanex refuted the investor's claim based on
the deprivation of a reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit. The latter
maintained that since the challenged governmental order is taken for general welfare
and without discrimination, the state is not liable for compensation. Later in Saluka v.
Czech Republic, the Tribunal stated that "it is now established in international law that
States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal
331
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exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona
fide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare."334 Under the police power
doctrine, if the state measure is non-discriminatory, taken for a legitimate public
purpose and in accordance with due process of law, no compensation will be awarded,
unless a specific commitment was initially made vis-à-vis an investor.335 However,
the Saluka award recognizes the difficulty of such approach in application by
concluding that "international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and
definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered permissible and
commonly accepted as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and,
thus, non-compensable."336

The adoption of "public interest" as a decisive criterion in both Methanex and Saluka
awards to distinguish lawful regulation from expropriation may be seen as a step
forward in curbing the inflexible protection of investment. However, the volatile
definition of public interest under international law makes it practically impossible to
distill comprehensive requirements for non-compensable regulations under the police
power doctrine. Further, the restrictive approach in interpreting indirect expropriation
through disregarding the effect of the state measure on an investor is detrimental to
international investment law at large.337 Finally, it is worth mentioning that both
decisions, Methanex and Saluka, were decided in accordance with the UNCTRAL
model law. Some commentators have justified this restrictive approach to indirect
expropriation regulatory power by the fact that both cases have involved regulatory
powers taken by developed states to deal with increasing challenges to national
security, health or environment.338 I believe that similar awards in the same vein
under ICSID's arbitration rules are rare, if they exist at all.
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D.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I examined the governing legal framework of investment treaty
tribunals under the ICSID. The Washington Convention does not constitute a selfcontained substantive regime for ITA. In section one, I sought to answer whether
variations in investment treaty terms have driven international investment law to
fragmentation. It is suggested that quid pro quo bargains and relative negotiating
powers of treaty parties underlying the concept of BITs have rendered the latter
essentially variable in content and structure. Nevertheless, I argued that changes in
BITs terms are mainly concerned with generalities rather than details of substantive
standards of treatment. Most of BITs contain standardized provisions for investment
protection particularly on the prohibition of non-compensable expropriation, FET and
MFN. I found that even in cases of almost identical treaty terms, arbitral tribunals
arrive at consistent interpretation of international minimum standards. It is true that
the treaty parties create their own investment treaty, yet arbitral tribunals turn out to
be the supreme interpreters of when and how treaty law applies. Treaty parties are
assumed to impliedly delegate comprehensive interpretive power to one-off arbitral
tribunals. However, the scope of interpretation the tribunal may exert increases or
decreases depending on either the clarity or the ambiguity of treaty language. The
more ambiguous is the treaty language, the wider is the scope of interpretation to an
investment tribunal. I concluded that despite variations in treaty terms, the effect of
the latter remains subordinate to tribunals‟ interpretations in predicting outcomes.
In section two, I critically scrutinized the ICSID's asymmetrical basis of jurisdiction
in defining both the "protected investment" and the "protected investor". It is quite
odd that neither the Convention Preamble, nor the conventional terms provide a
definition for what is to be qualified as a protected investment for the purpose of the
ICSID litigation. Despite the fact that the Preamble clearly requires a certain
contribution by a private international investment to the contracting states economic
development in order to be qualified as an investment, some tribunals have
intentionally ignored such a requirement. The parameters set forth in most B/MITs on
what constitutes an investment are frequently similar in term and content, yet they
often provide vague conditions for defining an investment. In light of this lacuna,
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ICSID arbitral panels take a broad approach in interpreting protected investment with
an aim to amplify protection for transnational investment. Even though earlier
decisions defer to the preamblar condition regarding the contribution of an investment
to the host state's economic development, recent jurisprudence shows divergent
approaches in defining an investment. Some tribunals like Victor Pey and Quiborax
endorse a restrictive approach that depends on mere textual meaning while ignoring
the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. Moreover, the high degree of legal
sophistication, technical complexity and costly proceedings in the ICSID litigation
limits the jurisdiction rationae personae of the ICSID to multinational corporations
and developed countries‟ investors. I noted that a little amount of the literature on ITA
discusses the discriminatory nature of the ICSID litigation in excluding the domestic
investors from the international minimum standards of protection. I argued that such
jurisdictional deficit rigorously contravenes the well-established procedural rules of
fairness and equality.
In section three, I drew on the different approaches used by investment treaty
tribunals to interpret the definition of indirect expropriation. Jurisprudence on ITA has
reversed "the possession paradigm" in expropriation to include other forms of indirect
takings. Yet, it provides no definite distinction between the latter and the state lawful
regulation. Thus, Investment treaty tribunals rely on variable textual interpretations
for defining expropriation as the central standard in international investment law. The
lack of a binding rule of precedent along with an appellate body in the practice of ITA
has exacerbated inconsistency whether at the jurisdictional or substantive level.
Furthermore, introducing a third category of measures "tantamount to expropriation"
in the newer version of BITs provides a basis for an expansionist interpretation to
state regulatory acts in relation to foreign investors. Thinking of ITA as a form of
commercial arbitration, most investment treaty tribunals have taken the law of
expropriation beyond the treaty parties consent. Instead of objectively examining the
governmental regulatory action in the course of awarding damages, arbitral tribunals
endorse an "all or nothing" paradigm that considers the interests of either party.
Neither the "sole effect criterion" nor the "police power doctrine" provides for a
comprehensive approach to the distinction between compensatory expropriation and
non-compensable state regulation.
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IV.

INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC LAW
ADJUDICATION: MAPPING OUT A REGULATORY SPACE FOR
THE HOST STATE

Even though investment treaty arbitration combines the form and procedures of
international commercial arbitration, it performs under the substantive principles of
public international law. As I argued in chapter one, the function of ITA in reviewing
and adjudicating states exercise of public authority vis-à-vis foreign investors makes
it akin to public law's judicial review of governmental actions. Yet, the private law
inclination of investment treaty tribunals towards inflexible protection of transnational
investment hinders the host state‟s right to pursue legitimate public policy objectives.
The expansive interpretations of international investment standards which were set
out in chapter two extend investment protection beyond the treaty parties' intention
under the ICSID conceptual framework. A significant part of the literature on ITA
puts forward a number of remedial measures to address the current fragmentation of
international investment regime. Most of these remedies focus on the institutional
reform of the ICSID legal framework. They vary from establishing an "independent
international investment court"339 to developing an "ICSID appellate body".340
Undoubtedly, that would help revise inconsistent awards that may be rendered under
one-off investment treaty tribunals.341 Other institutional proposals suggest a fairer
institutional process for appointing arbitrators in order to increase objectivity,
accountability and transparency in the practice of ITA.342 On the procedural level,
some studies recommend the "consolidation of claims", whenever applicable, to avoid
potentially conflicting conclusions by different tribunals on the same subject
matter.343 This technique would ensure procedural uniformity in the practice of ITA,
raise predictability of the host state and foreign investor and prevent over-litigation
and double recovery.344
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However, I contend that both institutional and procedural reforms are basically
contingent on either renegotiating the ICSID convention, or realizing a Multilateral
Agreement on investment protection (MAI) to replace the diverse network of BITs
existing today. Despite being comprehensive, these reform proposals seem unfeasible
due to the everlasting conflicting interests of developed and developing states,
multinational corporations, commercial arbitrators, and host states' civil society.345
Instead, this chapter presents a pragmatic approach based on the self-reformation of
investment treaty tribunals law-making. The hybridity of ITA is the entry point for
remoulding the law-making process on public law concepts of adjudication. I argue
that reintroducing ITA as a public law model of adjudication may drive the system to
self-reformation. To that effect, I set out a workable three-pronged framework for
investment treaty tribunals law-making; namely, interpretive, conceptual and
comparative. In section one, I lay out an interpretive approach for investment treaty
tribunals. I draw on the customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) as a basis for interpretation of substantive standards of protection.346
In section two, by applying the VCLT interpretive guidelines on the conceptual
framework of the Washington Convention, I emphasize the correlation between
investment protection and the host state's right to economic development as an object
to the ICSID. Further, I rely on article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention,
whenever a given BIT term allows, as a basis for integrating rules on corporate social
responsibility. In section three, I suggest a comparative framework for investment
treaty tribunals law-making. First, I point out to the significance of the general
principles of law and judicial decisions as formal sources of public international law
in reforming ITA from within. Second, I examine the use of proportionality in
comparative public law review of governmental actions. Considering its relevance to
ITA, I argue for accommodating the principle of proportionality as a general principle
of law in investment treaty tribunals law-making. For such an end, I lay out a threestep test to delineate the boundary between compensatory expropriation and noncompensable lawful regulation.
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A.

THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK: CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

Investment treaties cannot be interpreted in isolation from general international law. It
is well established under the principle pacta sunt servanda that treaty parties are
bound to carry out their international obligations in good faith. Still, international
investment law has not generated a self-contained system of substantive rights and
obligations. The open-ended investment standards and guarantees stated in a wide
body of B/MITs have yielded divergent interpretations by one-off arbitral tribunals.
Only a few investment treaties, like NAFTA,347Canada, and the US model BITs,
explicitly refer to the customary rules of international law on treaty interpretation.348
Additionally, the latter elaborates on the definition of customary international law.349
Even if there is no such explicit stipulation, investment treaty tribunals, operating
within the ambit of public international law, have a formal room for reference to
customary rules of international law applicable to investment disputes. Through
consenting to investment arbitration, treaty parties impliedly delegate their lawmaking powers, including most notably interpretive authority, to potential arbitral
tribunal. Since investment treaties create general rather than specific standards for the
protection of foreign investment, such standards must be interpreted before they can
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be applied. This justifies the fact that investment tribunals have historically taken the
lead in developing international investment law through law-making.350
1.

A Restrictive Approach to the VCLT Interpretive Guidelines

Since the very first treaty-based investment arbitration, AAPL v. Republic of Shri
Lanka, the interpretive guidelines of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) have been presumably considered in the tribunals' law-making process.351
Yet, most investment treaty tribunals take a restrictive approach in applying the
latter's "general rule of interpretation" under article 31. In doing so, tribunals limit
their interpretations to the ordinary meaning of investment treaty text under article 31
(1) while ignoring its object and purpose. It is quite odd that a large number of
investor-state tribunals have not even mentioned the interpretive guidelines of the
VCLT in defining the substantive principles of investment protection.352 As truly
observed by Sornarajah, the paradox lies in the fact that arbitral tribunals only satisfy
the ordinary meaning of treaty terms and turn a blind eye to the object and purpose of
the treaty as envisaged by article 31 and 32 of the VCLT.353 Such restrictive approach
not only abstracts investment standards from their intended purpose as originally
anticipated by the treaty parties, but also extends their application to undesired areas
of mere regulatory discretion of states. In that regard, the challenged award of Sempra
Energy International v. Argentina concludes that "interpretation is not the exclusive
task of States; it is also the duty of tribunals called upon to settle a dispute,
particularly when the question is to interpret the meaning of the terms used in a
treaty."354 Despite the clear reference to the VCLT interpretive rules, the award has
been challenged on grounds of manifest errors of law, excess of power and failure to
state reasons.355 Censuring Sempra's selective adherence to the general rule of
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interpretation, the annulment committee concludes that "relevant rules of international
law should be used to interpret BIT provisions that either reflect customary
international law or are not defined in the BIT. The Tribunal interpreted Article XI in
accordance with relevant rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in Articles 31 and
32 of the VCLT."356
On a different account, the tribunal in Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine made a controversial
decision on jurisdiction as a result of using a restrictive approach to interpretation.357
Despite the fact that the claimant Lithuanian corporation was controlled by Ukrainian
nationals who own (99) percent of the company‟s shares, incorporated under
Ukrainian law, maintained its administrative headquarters in the latter; the Tribunal
considered the company as falling within the category of protected investors under the
ICSID framework.358 This expansive approach misinterprets the rationae personae
jurisdictional basis of the ICSID in providing substantive protection only for foreign
investors as explicitly stated in both the Preamble and article 25 (1) of the
Convention. Further, it confuses the legal theories on nationality of international
corporations whether under civil law or common law systems. Whereas the former
endorses the nationality or domicile of individuals dominating the majority of shares
as a decisive criterion, the latter recognizes the administrative seat as a basis for the
enterprise nationality.359 Thus, the Tokios Tokéles tribunal did not comprehensively
apply the VCLT interpretive guidelines. First, the tribunal has restricted the definition
of investors to the ordinary textual meaning of the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, while
ignoring the main object of the Washington convention as only protecting foreign
rather than domestic investors. Second, the non-exhaustive interpretation of the VCLT
guidelines in examining the definition of protected investors under the LithuaniaUkraine BIT has expanded the scope of protection beyond the treaty party intention –
Ukraine in the given case.
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2.

A Comprehensive Methodology for Investment Treaty Tribunals' LawMaking

Against this backdrop, I believe that the faithful application of customary
international rules on treaty interpretation provided for in articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT would tackle the inconsistent practice of ITA from within. In fact, both articles
offer an interpretive methodology which covers both bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties. I argue for an interpretive methodology for investment treaty
tribunals' law-making process that fulfills two essential features: it must be inclusive
and exhaustive. First, I mean by the inclusive application that the VCLT interpretative
rules must be inclusively applied to the substance of both the Washington Convention
and the BIT in question. The Washington Convention is perceived as constituting the
overarching legal framework of ITA that gives rise to the conclusion of thousands of
B/MITs. This follows that the latter should not by any mean contravene the former‟s
general provisions as in the case of Tokios Tokéles with respect to the definition of an
investor under the ICSID framework. Thus, the inclusive application of article 31 and
32 of the VCLT interpretive rules appears to be indispensable in discerning the full
understanding of the minimum standards of protection in the case at hand. Moreover,
I argue that such application of articles 31 and 32 has a specific importance in striking
a balanced conceptual framework as to the rights and obligations of both parties under
the ICSID litigation, as I will elaborate on in the next sub-section.360 In spite of the
fact that article 31 may suffice in some cases to extract the essence of the treaty
conventional terms, it does not do the same to the preamblar terms of the ICSID
Convention or other BITs. Therefore, article 32 comes into play whenever article 31
leads to indefinite, vague or unreasonable conclusions361 like what has been
experienced by many arbitral tribunals while interpreting the definition of investment
under article 25 (1) of the Washington Convention.362 There is no doubt that the
historical context, socio-political conditions and negotiation circumstances that
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coincided with the treaty conclusion are of mounting concern in distilling the parties'
real intentions.363
Second, investment treaty tribunals must exhaustively apply the interpretive
techniques set forth in the general rule of interpretation under article 31 of the VCLT.
This exhaustive approach is in fact required by the clear language of article 31 (1)
which provides that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty [in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose].” The word "and" demonstrates that the examination of
the interpretive means should not be confined to the treaty's ordinary meaning of the
texts; rather it should go further to examine the parties' mutual intent at the time they
have signed an investment treaty. This dictates a cumulative application of the
"ordinary meaning" as well as the "object and purpose criteria" as stated in article 31
(1) as a first step. In that meaning, I emphasize that the tribunal must ascertain that the
ordinary meaning criterion matches rather than supplements the object and purpose of
the treaty. In a second step, the tribunal proceeds to examine all other prescribed
interpretive techniques provided for under the general rule of interpretation in article
31 to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the treaty terms in light of its object
and purpose. In this meaning, article 31 (2) of the VCLT elaborates on the context
stipulated in article 31 (1): "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes…"
This language requires that the process of interpretation must not stop at article 31 (1)
of the VCLT, rather it must proceed with the examination of other interpretive
guidelines provided for under article 31 (2), (3) and (4) in the first place and article 32
in the second place.364

363

Id. at 109
Article 31 (2) of the VCLT stipulates that "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the
treaty; (b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty."
Article 31 (3) states that: "There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of
its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties."
364

74

B.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: COUNTERBALANCING INVESTOR’S
RIGHTS WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONVENTION

The expansive interpretations of investment treaty tribunals have elevated the foreign
investor‟s private rights over the host state‟s public interests. Public international law
principles of sovereign independence and non-intervention are blatantly eroded under
the current practice of ITA.365 The Preamble of the Washington Convention confirms
the role of private international investment in promoting economic cooperation and
development among contracting states. Particularly, developing countries had
perceived the advent of the ICSID as a global tool for attracting FDI to their nascent
economies.366 They have signed B/MITs with the intention of giving the capitalexporting states positive signals that they owe their investors preferential treatment
over their territories. In that sense, the ICSID is primarily seen as a balancing
equilibrium between sovereign states and foreign investors.367 However, as critically
shown in chapter two, some empirical findings question the relationship between ITA
under the ICSID and the promotion of economic development in the host states. In
particular, low and middle-income developing countries are double-burdened by
costly proceedings and highly punitive awards under ICSID litigation. Thus, the
decisive function of ITA in boosting the economic development of the host states
becomes more dubious by the unrestrained interpretations of investment treaty
standards.368

The unpredictable application of the minimum standards of protection has largely
barred host states from pursuing national econometric policies essential for
development.369 Moreover, it has even disallowed the latter from holding
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) accountable for their wrongdoing against the
residing population in matters of common concern such as healthcare, environmental
Article 31 (4) states that "A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended."
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protection, human rights, labour entitlements, fighting corruption, taxation and
financial regulation. Although there has been a shift in state practice towards
curtailing the penetration of ITA into the public regulatory sphere, tribunals seem
hesitant to respond to non-investment concerns. Building on the proposed
comprehensive methodology for interpretation, I intend to reconceptualise the
objectives of ITA under the ICSID legal framework. In doing so, I aim to restore the
legal equilibrium between the protection of foreign investment and the host state‟s
right to pursue economic development. Second, I draw on an integrationist
interpretation of both article 31 (3) (C) of the VCLT and article 42 (1) of the
Washington Convention, when applicable, to develop rules on corporate social
responsibility vis-à-vis host states. These rules, I argue, would essentially
equiponderate the host state's international responsibility for injuries to foreign
investors.

1.

Identifying the Host State's Right to Economic Development as an Object
to ICSID Litigation

In the midst of the ICSID negotiations, contracting states have disputed the definition
of protected investment and consequently have left the matter to the parties consent in
each BIT and then to the tribunal's discretionary power.370 While developing states
have managed to stress the essence of public interest in investor-state disputes,
developed states aimed to maximize the sanctity of private property. For example the
United Kingdom, as a capital-exporting country, has proposed a definition of
investment based on economic activity rather than economic development.371 This
conflict has ultimately led the contracting states not to assign a definition of
investment to the Washington Convention at all.372 Article 25 (1) establishing the
mainline jurisdiction of the ICSID stipulates that “the jurisdiction of the Center shall
apply to [any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment] between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State
designated by that State to the Center) and a national of another Contracting State.”
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Obviously, the language in "any legal dispute" maintains a broad scope of what may
qualify as an investment for the purpose of the ICSID convention.373 Therefore, the
Washington convention has principally transferred the burden of defining the
protected investment to the law-making power of investment treaty tribunals
depending on the BIT terms at issue.374

In contrast to ICSID's conventional terms, the Preamble has clearly emphasized the
correlation between protection of private international investment and promotion of
economic development in the contracting states. In this meaning, the very first
paragraph of the Preamble provides that “Considering the need for international
cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein; bearing in mind the possibility that from time to time disputes
may arise in connection with such investment between Contracting States and
nationals of other Contracting States."375 Even though the Preamble does not provide
comprehensive definition of investment, it sets out a general condition for qualifying
the protected investment, that is, the contribution of the protected investment to the
host state's economic development. Nevertheless, historical political and economic
circumstances denote that the promotion of economic development of the host states
side-by-side with the protection of transnational investment has been the main object
of ITA under the ICSID framework.376 In that sense, ITA is perceived as a decisive
tool for economic development more than an alternative method for dispute
settlement.377 States agreed to grant foreign investors and multinational corporations a
preferential treatment with the intention of attracting foreign capital flows as essential
for the process of economic development.378
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Despite the fact that each BIT encompasses a self-standing definition of investment,
most BITs use the same exact provisions for qualifying protected investment.379
While some investment treaties, like the US model BITs of 1994, 2004 and 2012,
have maintained the same preamblar condition on the contribution to the host state's
economic development, others have remained silent towards the latter.380 Following
the same line of argument in chapter two, I believe that the investment treaty
tribunals' inconsistent interpretations of the definition of investment rather than treaty
term variations brought about the fragmentation of international investment law.
Some recent decisions like Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. The
Republic of Chile and Quiborax v. Bolivia have ignored the criterion of the
“contribution to the host state's economic development” in qualifying an investment
for the purpose of the ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie.381 These tribunals have
restricted the interpretation of investment definition to the ordinary meaning of treaty
terms through selective application of article 31 of the VCLT. I contend that such
restrictive reading of treaty terms neither reflects the BIT parties' intention, nor
observes the central object of the ICSID in promoting states economic development.
In this respect, I argue that the inclusive and exhaustive application of the interpretive
guidelines laid down by the VCLT would help in defining the protected investment.

On the one hand, the inclusive application of the VCLT interpretive guidelines entails
that the tribunal's interpretation of investment under a given BIT be consistent with
the overarching framework of the ICSID convention. Thus, the definition of the
protected investment must primarily satisfy the general condition set out by the ICSID
Preamble, i.e. foreign investment contribution to the host state's economic
development. This comprehensive methodology for qualifying an investment is quite
supported by article 31 (2) (a) and (b) of the VCLT general rule which provides that:
[T]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble
and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion
379
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of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or
more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.382
Undoubtedly, this essentially involves the Washington Convention, being recognized
in advance by both parties to a given BIT. Furthermore, article 31 (2) also comprises
the United Nations Charter as a multilateral legal instrument of public international
law.383 In spite of its generic nature, the UN Charter embraces a considerable amount
of international law principles, particularly the principle of sovereign equality of
states.384 Since it is mutually accepted by state parties, the latter must be considered
by investment treaty tribunal while interpreting the definition of an investment
pursuant to a given BIT term. In that sense, sovereign equality entails that the host
state must authorize a certain activity over its territory in order to be qualified as a
protected investment for the purpose of the ICSID Convention.385

On the other hand, the exhaustive application of the VCLT guidelines requires that the
tribunal satisfy all interpretive techniques under the general rule of article 31(1), (2),
(3) and (4).386 This means that the tribunal must understand that the ordinary meaning
of a treaty text complements rather than contradicts the object and purpose of the
ICSID. For such an end, it shall equally consider preamblar texts side by side with
conventional texts in deciding what qualifies as an investment. In addition to that, the
exhaustive approach of interpretation allows the tribunal, in the event the general rule
of interpretation under article 31 does not produce consistent conclusion recourse to
the supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 (a) and (b). The latter
stipulates that “Recourse may be made to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the
382
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meaning ambiguous or obscure; (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”387 This may be useful where a BIT does not provide for the general
criterion on the contribution to the host state's economic development such as in the
(2005) German model BIT.388 Such recourse, I believe, is imperative to maintain an
interpretive balance between the given BIT terms and the ICSID convention.
In defining the protected investment under the Jordan–Italy BIT, the remarkable
award of Salini et al. v. Morocco (2001) considers the Preamble's limitation on the
ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie.389 While interpreting the definition of
investment under the given BIT, the tribunal concluded that “[the common intention]
of the Parties is reflected in this clear text.” These words obviously contest the textual
argument in defining protected investment as relying on mere "economic activity or
asset" and goes further to examine ICSID's purpose in promoting the contracting
states economic development. Presided over by Judge Guillaume, the tribunal laid
down an interpretive methodology based on the inclusive and exhaustive application
of the VCLT interpretive guidelines. In doing so, Salini duly observes the parties‟
intention beyond the ordinary meaning of article 31 and 32 as evidenced whether in
the ICSID Preamble or its travaux prepartoires. Finally, the tribunal develops a "fourpart test" which requires an investment to have four essential elements in order to be
qualified as protected under the ICSID jurisdiction; namely: “a contribution of money
or assets; a fixed duration; an element of risk; and a contribution to the host state‟s
economic development.”390

The jurisprudential adherence to the Salini four-part test would not only promote
economic development of the contracting states as an object of the ICSID, but also
provide the host states with more predictability in the practice of ITA. Yet, a
counterargument against the suggested comprehensive methodology for interpretation
is that the VCLT general rule of interpretation applies only to state-to-state disputes
and consequently does not cover international disputes involving individuals. In this
regard, Weeramantry confirms that the VCLT customary rules are applicable to all
387
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international disputes regardless of their subject matter or involved parties. He
contends that this methodology is best exemplified by the European Court of Human
Rights' interpretive approach which consistently refers to the VCLT customary rules
of interpretation, despite featuring individual-state disputes.391 From a public law
perspective, customary rules of international law justify the application of the Salini
test in the practice of ITA as public law adjudication. In my view, Salini award offers
a balanced approach to the interpretation of the definition of investment as it accounts
equally for private corporate interests and public policy concerns. Further, the Salini
four-part test lays down a strong jurisdictional precedent that respects the principle of
sovereign independence of states in approving investment entry into their
territories.392

2.

Integrating Rules on Corporate Social Responsibility in Investor-State
Disputes

The core concept of investment treaty arbitration is to provide foreign MNCs an
alternative dispute resolution system away from the national court system. At the
same time, the legal status of MNCs renders them practically unbound whether by the
international investment law principles or the host state's internal laws and
regulations. In exploring the reform of international investment law in the area of
corporate conduct, the hybrid nature of ITA comes again into play. The difficulty here
lies in the fact that multinational corporations (MNCs), unlike state parties, are not
counted among subjects of international law. Instead, they are private law entities
operating on the international sphere.393 This legal status is what I believe makes ITA
a one-sided litigation since investment treaty tribunals have not so far developed a
methodology that fits into the unique public-private nature of ITA.394 In this regard,
Stephan Schill insightfully points out that "When the two streams of investment
protection and corporate responsibility meet and mix, it will be difficult to maintain a
system of inflexible investment protection.395 The emergence of new defences with
391
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respect to corporate responsibility in the newer generation of BITs strongly pushes
towards a balanced law-making process. In the same vein, I propose the adoption of
an integrationist approach that embraces the customary rules of interpretation as
enshrined in articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT insofar as the conceptual framework of
the given BIT permits. I propose a two-fold approach to ITA self-reformation that
suits the hybridity of the ICSID dispute resolution system.
First, I argue for integrating domestic legal instruments and mechanisms on corporate
compliance. The conceptual framework of article 42 (1) of the Washington
Convention, whenever applicable, constitutes a basis for an integrationist approach to
reform. According to article 42 (1) of the Convention: “The tribunal shall decide
disputes in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. [In the
absence of such agreement], the tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting state
party to the dispute (including rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law that may be applicable.” Although article 42 (1) concludes that the
substantive law to ICSID disputes is to be determined in accordance with the parties
agreement, it advances the applicability of the host state internal law in the absence of
an agreement. The remarkable award of World Duty Free v. Kenya presents
jurisprudential evidence towards the integration of corporate responsibility in arbitral
tribunals law-making.396 The award relied on English law, particularly the common
law rule of "unclean hands", to invalidate an investment agreement for proven
allegations of corruption at the inception of foreign investment. Even though the
World Duty Free arbitration was contract-based investment dispute, it opens a door to
the host state counterclaims in cases of proven corruption.397 This unequivocally
suggests the possibility of embracing corporate social responsibility (CSR) into the
domestic law of the host state. In the case of contractual investment arbitration,
foreign investors are frequently subject to the host state's internal law pursuant to a
contractual relationship.398 However, I contend that article 42 (1) allows investment
treaty tribunals interpretive leeway for integrating domestic rules on CSR into the
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law-making process. Thus, even though the host state and the foreign investor agree
on the substantive applicable law to the dispute, this does not, by any means, render
the domestic law of the host state irrelevant to the merits of the dispute.399
I believe that the ICSID legal framework diminishes the jurisdiction of the host state
law insofar as the latter contradicts or minimizes the international standards of
protection for foreign investment. In fact, this is consistent with the customary rules
of international law. In this respect, article 27 of the VCLT entitled, "Internal Law and
Observance of Treaties", provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Conveying the same
meaning, article 3 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility for internationally
wrongful acts insists on the same customary rule: “The characterization of an act of a
state as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such
characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by
internal law.”400 This means that the host state's domestic laws and regulations may be
applied in ITA on two main conditions: first, the absence of investment contract
providing for "Stabilization Clause"; second, the internal law or regulation in question
is consistent with the general international law as lex fori. Indeed, it is quite
impossible to decide an investor-state dispute without reference to the host state
internal laws, regulations or governmental decisions. It is indispensable for
investment treaty tribunals to apply the host state's law while deciding both
preliminary and substantive matters of a given dispute. This essentially includes
issues of jurisdiction, nationality of the treaty parties and legality of governmental
acts or omissions vis-à-vis foreign investors.401
Second, I suggest that international investment law should be reconceptualised on the
basis of international mutual responsibility. The scope of investor-state disputes
should move beyond the traditional notion of corporate profitability to social benefits.
For such an end, I argue that the investment treaty tribunal's fullest application of
article 42 (1) in light of the VCLT customary rule of interpretation particularly under
article 31 (3) (c) would better accommodate international corporate responsibility into
399
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the practice of ITA. Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT stipulates that “There shall be
taken into account, together with the context: any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.” In addition to the substantive law
agreed upon by the parties in accordance with article 42 (1), investment treaty
tribunals may rely on article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT to incorporate any international
instruments applicable to the dispute in question into its legal reasoning. 402 Although
the second method of reform which is based on the integrationist approach to the
VCLT general rule of interpretation is much more palatable to most international law
academics and practitioners, it seems to me impractical in some way. This is since the
two most prominent attempts to adopt internationalised rules on CSR have never
entered into force. Intriguingly, both attempts were led under the auspices of the
OECD. In 1976, the latter adopted guidelines addressing transnational corporate
responsibility for the first time. Once again in 1998, it proposed a Multilateral
Agreement on transnational Investment (MAI) including comprehensive rules on
corporate conduct. Indeed, there are a large number of soft law instruments on CSR
that have been adopted on the international plane, yet none of which have found way
to multilateral legal framework. Thus, soft law instruments and preamblar provisions
on CSR have rarely been encompassed in the law-making process of investment treaty
tribunal.403
In fact, the natural inclination of the ICSID system towards private interests shows
hesitancy in giving legal weight to other areas of international law, such as human
rights, sustainable development or environmental protection. Nonetheless, the major
shift in state practice towards a more comprehensive version of BITs which account
for non-investment standards proves to be significant with respect to the development
of a normative order on corporate compliance.404 Yet, the current version of
preamblar terms has proven to be impractical in informing the treaty parties' intention.
It offers the investment tribunal a negative rather than positive room for discretion.
This vagueness has yielded many inconsistent interpretations of non-investment
standards and consequently has affected the legitimacy of ITA at large.405 In order to
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blunt the one-sided nature of investor-state disputes, Muchlinski suggests the
inclusion of investor responsibilities along with that of the host state in the tribunals'
process of interpretation.406

For instance, many states have revised their model investment treaties to account for
more strict provisions on corporate social responsibility; these include for example,
the Russian Federation amendment in 2002, France in 2006 and the United States in
2004 and 2012. Other countries are currently in the process of developing a new
model BIT such as Argentine, South Africa, Egypt and Turkey. In redrafting the
treaties, states aim to achieve an “appropriate balance between protection of the rights
of foreign investors on the one hand, and recognition of the legitimate sphere of
operation of the host State on the other.”407 From the standpoint of domestic law,
corporate social responsibility of foreign investors takes place through ensuring a
minimum standard of corporate conduct. As such, foreign investors undertake social
and environmental commitments to national laws, regulations, and codes of conduct.
In addition to the legal obligations, some developing states set up CSR on the basis of
developmental obligations in domestic infrastructural fields such as healthcare,
education, public utility, urbanization, sanitation and energy.408

C.

THE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK: ACCOMMODATING PUBLIC LAW
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION LAWMAKING

The chain of global economic crises which erupted in the 2000s has dramatically
changed the dynamics of the international investment regime. Argentine's arduous
course of litigation brought about new-fangled defences in the practice of ITA such as
the state of necessity.409 The inconsistent arbitral decisions that grew out of over fifty
claims against Argentine severely affected the credibility of ITA in advancing host
406
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states' economic development.410 The emergency measures undertaken by many states
in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crises have considerably altered the theory of
expropriation towards a more nuanced understanding of non-compensable
regulation.411 In contrast to Argentine's case, the US and other European states'
interventions to contain economic calamity especially in the banking system have
been faced with great appeasement on the global financial level.412 This contradictory
approach has raised significant questions concerning the scope of state regulatory
powers vis-à-vis investment protection. More intriguingly, some traditional capitalimporting powers, like the BRICS countries, became key transnational investment
players in Western capital-exporting countries. This shift in roles between inward and
outward sources of investment along with some host states backlash against the
ICSID has been echoed by a new version of BITs which provides for states'
regulatory measures in public policy matters including health, environment and
taxation.

States' reaction to the system pitfalls has driven most of investment treaty tribunals to
rediscover customary principles of international law in order to balance between
investment protection and state regulation. Thus, public law principles of sovereign
independence, non-intervention and administrative discretion have been revived in the
practice of ITA. Investment treaty tribunals' scope of reviewability and interpretation
of the open-ended investment standards has become in some way limited by
investment treaty terms. Moreover, sufficient jurisprudential evidence shows variable
attempts to accommodate public law concepts in tribunals' decision making
process.413 Understanding the regulatory nature of ITA, some academics and
practitioners in the field highlight the importance of a comparative public law
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approach to the interpretation of investment standards.414 For some, this may be
realised by reference to the public law principles which are applicable to individualstate disputes such as the World Trade Organisation's appellate body (WTO) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).415 Others trace the crux of investor-state
disputes back to the general principles of domestic administrative judicial review of
governmental actions.416 As Professor Crawford aptly noticed, international
investment law as sub-discipline of public international law "is presently in a period
of comparative openness and reformation."417 It is true that the current "sense of
fluidity" in the practice of investment treaty arbitration threatens its future as the most
preferred mechanism for the settlement of transnational investment disputes,418 yet
such fluidity marks an invaluable opportunity towards the substantive selfreformation of ITA.419

The ultimate purpose of this section is to figure out a legal margin for investment
treaty tribunals in order to reconcile the host state‟s legitimate regulation with the
protection of foreign investment. Depending on the public law interpretive framework
laid out in section one, I seek to explore the prospective role of both general principles
of law and judicial decisions as formal sources of public international law in
reforming the substantive investment law from within. In sub-section one, I set out a
comparative public law methodology for refining the content and scope of the openended standards of investment protection. I intend to emphasize the interaction
between treaty-based investment arbitration and a comparative public law approach
through referring to administrative law adjudicative principles applicable to
regulatory disputes. In that sense of use, I propose accommodating the principle of
proportionality as a general principle of law in major legal systems into the law414
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making process of investment treaty tribunals.420 In sub-section two, I lay out a
"three-step test" for delineating the boundary between compensatory indirect
expropriation and non-compensable state regulation.

1.

The Legal Foundation for Substantive Investment Law Reformation:
General Principles of Law and Judicial Decisions

Investment treaty tribunals must not interpret international investment principles in a
legal vacuum; rather they have to resort to the concept of sources of International Law
as enshrined in article (38) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In
the event treaty terms run out of a legal solution, arbitral tribunals may appeal to
customary rules of international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) sets forth the legal basis for interpreting the treaty parties' substantive rights
and obligations. Consistent with the regulatory nature of investor-state disputes, a
comparative public law methodology seems feasible for informing the unbounded
substantive provisions of investment treaties. The on-going change towards ensuring
the host state's right to regulate in BITs terms supports the idea of interpreting
international investment standards through a public law lens.421 As Professor Pierre
Lalive puts it: "an international arbitration should be decided by a truly 'international
arbitrator', i.e. someone who is more than a national lawyer, someone who is
internationally-minded, trained in comparative law and inclined to adopt a
comparative and truly international outlook."422 Therefore, it is crucial for an
international arbitrator to grasp the sources of international investment law in order to
define its substance. Unraveling the debate that underlies the different sources of
420
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public international law would determine what substantive law applies in the
resolution of investor-state disputes.423Make no mistake, this is not an easy task,
rather it requires a high degree of legal diligence and objectivity.

In order to address the current pitfalls of ITA, I suggest the integration of new sources
of international law into the investment treaty tribunals' law-making process. Chief
among these sources are the general principles of law and judicial decisions.424
Indeed, the content of some reliable sources of general international law may seem
irrelevant to an arbitrator while deciding a specific dispute because of treaty term
limitation, notwithstanding the fact that most BITs offer wide latitude for analyzing
different sources of law. Both general principles of law and judicial decisions are
encompassed in article 38 (1) (c), (d) of the statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) among traditional sources of international law.425 Although the essence
of article 38 (1), which exhaustively enumerates sources of international law, reveals
no legal hierarchy among sources, general principles of law and judicial decisions are
often perceived as secondary sources of international law.426 Yet, international
practice has yielded a critical change regarding the concept of sources of international
law, since states become purportedly bound by new set of norms to which they have
never been explicitly consented.427 The relatively modern concept of jus cogens
presents a strong proposition in this regard especially that it has a doctrinal avenue
under article 53 of the VCLT. However, there remains a heated debate concerning the
cogency of modern sources of international law due to the consent-based nature
prevailing over the concept of sources under article 38 of the ICJ statute. Nonetheless,
I confine the present analysis to the traditional sources of international law for the
purposes of study limitation.
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Theoretically, general principles of law and judicial decisions come into play through
filling gaps in the absence of applicable treaty terms, or international customary rules.
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that the "general principles of law may be a
necessary and inevitable way of filling a lacuna in the interpretation of a specific
question."428 Even though there is no rule of stare decisis in international law
adjudication whether under article 59 of the ICJ statute or article 53 (1) of the ICSID
Convention, investment treaty tribunals frequently rely on domestic and international
law jurisprudence.429 In light of this analysis, I contend that the issue does not lie in
the lack of interpretational means, rather it lies in the misapplication of the existing
ones. I argue that the legal foundation for a comparative public law approach to ITA
may be found whether in the VCLT interpretive guidelines or the ICSID conceptual
framework. On the one hand, the comprehensive application of article 31(3) (c) of the
VCLT interpretive rules may produce relevant customary international law rules
applicable between the treaty parties including general principles of law in national
and international law-based adjudications.430 As Stephan Schill asserts, this depends
on the interpretative leeway allowed under a given international investment
agreements.431 On the other hand, article 42 (1) of the ICSID Convention typically
provides for the application of domestic law alongside with customary rules of
international law "as may be applicable"; this may possibly cover general principles
of law and comparative law jurisprudence. This is no doubt contingent on the treaty
parties' agreement concerning the applicable law to the dispute.432 Yet, a comparative
public law approach is supported by recent investment treaty arbitrations despite the
absence of explicit consent by the treaty parties.433
Furthermore, evidence has been found in international investment law scholarship that
a comparative public law approach may improve the practice of ITA. Some model
428

See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, 180 (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press) (1958)
429
See supra note 421 at 89
430
Article 31 (3) (C) stipulates that "There shall be taken into account, together with the context…Any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."
431
See supra note 15
432
Id.
433
For example, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the Tribunal has applied proportionality analysis as a means to
the distinction between compensatory expropriation and non-compensable regulatory taking, though
the parties have not explicitly agreed on its application; See ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, (Final
award, May 29, 2003)

90

BITs currently provide for the use of domestic law concepts as general principles of
law in interpreting and applying the minimum standards of investment protection.434
On their part, investment treaty tribunals have frequently relied on the jurisprudence
of previous national administrative and constitutional courts.435 In the course of
regulatory takings and environmental protection, recent investment treaty tribunals
have relied on the US Supreme Court's "Penn Central balancing test" in order to
assess the legitimacy of regulatory takings in light of the investment-backed
expectations.436 Other investment treaty tribunals have made recourse to the ICJ and
the European Human Rights Court (EHRC) case law to elaborate on key legal
concepts most notably full protection and security, indirect expropriation and
corporate nationality.437 For instance, in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates,438 the
arbitral tribunal referred to the ICJ's Nottebohm case while discussing the issue of the
investor's nationality. Also in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, the tribunal
drew on the limits of applying proportionality analysis in the course of investor-state
disputes.439 Furthermore, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been and still one of the
most reliable sources for investment treaty tribunals. For example, in Saipem v.
Bangladesh, the Tribunal relied excessively on the latter's case law to assess the
lawfulness of the state's expropriatory measure.440 Drawing on this authority, I argue
that developing a qualitative methodology for the operation of general principles of
law in the practice of investment treaty tribunals would help in disentangling the
competing interests of investors and host states in ITA.441
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2.

Delineating the Boundary between Compensatory Expropriation and
Non-compensable State Regulation: A Three-part Proportionality Test

The 'threefold' formulation of direct, indirect and acts tantamount to expropriation has
proven to be futile in application. It has ended up widening the scope of indirect
expropriation to include most regulatory actions of host states. Investment treaty
tribunals have never succeeded in drawing the line between compensatory indirect
expropriation and non-compensable state measure. As previously mentioned in
chapter two, this formula has no comparable application in any domestic legal system.
The neoliberal-oriented drafters intentionally introduced them to maintain a normative
preferential treatment for foreign investors in host states.442 The tribunals' expansive
approach towards inflexible investment protection has largely shackled the host states
hands in regulating public law matters of common concern relating to the protection
of health, environment, human and labour rights.443 None of the prevailing doctrines
used by investment treaty tribunals have succeeded in either curbing the unbound
requirements for indirect expropriation or deciding the scope of non-compensatory
regulation of states.444

In deciding whether an expropriation has occurred, the "sole effect doctrine",
constituting the mainstream practice of investment treaty tribunals, examines the
economic impact of governmental action on investment. A minimal deprivation of
reasonably to-be-expected economic benefit is sufficient to establish compensatory
expropriation regardless of the lawfulness of state conduct.445 The "police power
doctrine" on the other hand, focuses on the gravity of the governmental action and
thus lessening of investment benefits to certain extent does not entitle an investor to
any compensation as long as the regulatory measure is taken lawfully.446 This "all or
nothing" approach of arbitral tribunals is mainly reduced to investigating the
occurrence of an expropriation instead of assessing its lawfulness or wrongfulness.
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Since cases of regulatory takings involve wide governmental discretion in proportion
to public policy objectives, this approach has always yielded imbalanced arbitral
awards. It is either the foreign investor who gets fully compensated in sacrifice to the
host state's interest to pursue public policy objectives, or it is the latter that gets
exempted from expropriation letting the former alone to incur the full economic
burden of its regulatory conduct. In other words, it is either full compensation or
nothing at all.447

Against this background, I argue that accommodating the principle of proportionality
into investment treaty tribunal law-making would help inform the definition of
indirect expropriation.448 To the extent that a given BIT terms allow interpretive
leeway, proportionality analysis may be used in reviewing the governmental action in
question in order to decide whether it meets the substantive requirements of an
expropriation.449 In contrast to the sole effect doctrine, proportionality analysis would
account for the host state's right to pursue public policy objectives through exercising
its inherent regulatory powers. Moreover, it would rationalize the rising police power
doctrine under some NAFTA arbitrations, particularly in health and environmental
issues, which has been criticized for undermining the very essence of investment
protection in investor-state disputes. I believe that proportionality analysis would nip
the recent notion of judicial activism in the bud as some voices have suggested
channeling the NAFTA attitude into investor-state arbitrations under the ICSID legal
framework.450

Nevertheless, most states have reacted to tribunals' unrestrained interpretations
through a new generation of BITs which include more strict terms on state regulatory
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power with respect to non-investment objectives. Most of the recent BITs have been
skimmed from the third category of "actions tantamount to takings", embraced new
defences to the host state's non-compensable interventions and reverted back the law
on expropriation to its original twofold formula, i.e. direct and indirect
expropriation.451 This on-going conceptual transformation in BITs opens a door to
consider comparative public law standards of review in ITA law-making. It further
marks a chance for arbitrators to develop comparative methods, integrate
proportionality analysis and respond to the competing public-private dichotomy in
order to keep the system alive.452 Kingsbury and Schill confirm this meaning:
"Proportionality analysis is a method of legal interpretation and decision-making in
situations of collisions or conflicts of different principles and legitimate public
objectives."453 In order to draw the line between compensatory expropriation and state
lawful regulation, the principle of proportionality furnishes a restrictive three-step
test. It is restrictive in the sense that it works within the conceptual framework of the
BIT in question on the one hand, and the customary rules of international law on the
other. Further, the test has three main themes that must be considered cumulatively
yet separately: the suitability of the given measure as to the ultimate object; the
necessity of the measure in light of its impact on an investment; and finally the
proportionality between the overall effects of the measure and its legitimate
objective.454

The first step in the proportionality analysis is two-fold. It encompasses both
psychological and material elements. The former relates to the state's intention and
whether the challenged governmental measure is taken to serve a legitimate public
interest. This means that the measure must be adopted for general welfare and on a
non-discriminatory basis.455 The material element concerns the suitability of the
governmental measure to attain a legitimate public purpose. The arbitral tribunal has
to establish a causal link between the taken measure and the targeted public purpose.
Further, suitability of an act entails that such act must be taken in accordance with the
451
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due process of law.456 In this regard, the tribunal must assess the legality of the
challenged act in light of the national law of the host state as well as customary
international law according to article 3 of the ILC.457 Thus, if the state action
constitutes a violation of an international legal norm it would be deemed illegitimate
even if it is lawful under the host state law. Finally, it may happen at any point that
the tribunal finds out that the governmental measure is illegitimate, discriminatory,
corrupt or aimed at private benefit. In any of these cases, the tribunal would not
proceed to the next two steps of the proportionality analysis.458

The second step of the proportionality test involves analysis of the necessity of the
challenged measure. It questions whether the government could have adopted another
measure that is less detrimental to the rights and interests of the given investment yet
equally attain the targeted public purpose as identified in the first step. In that sense,
the arbitrator has to examine all alternative policies before the decision-maker and
whether there were more feasible and effective choices that do not equally encroach
upon the investor's rights and interests as the challenged measure has done. For
instance, a state cannot justify its regulatory measure either on the basis of suitability
or necessity in order to violate a fundamental human right under customary rules of
international law. This means that the second step not only requires examining the
necessity of the governmental measure compared to other effective public policy
alternatives, but also the proportionality of the measure to the investor's protected
rights and interests.459

Lastly, in the third step, and if the challenged measure has fulfilled the two previous
steps, the tribunal would engage in a proportionality analysis stricto sensu that
initially requires balancing the aggregate impact of the challenged governmental
measure on the investor's rights and interests with the genuineness of the targeted
public purpose.460 This step is crucial as to deciding whether there is an obligation to
pay compensation at first, and assessing the amount of such compensation at second.
456
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In this regard, proportionality analysis stricto sensu must consider all available factors
on a case-by-case-basis. This essentially includes, the genuineness and legality of the
targeted public purpose, the gravity of the regulatory measure, the substance of the
protected right, the contribution of investor's own conduct, the investment-backed
expectations, the degree of loss based on a cost-benefit analysis, the quantity and
period of interference, the available alternative measures and their degree of
effectiveness and the adequacy of indemnification made, if any. Finally, the third step
is central to the proportionality analysis in that it restricts the suitability (first step)
and the necessity of pursuing a public purpose (second step) to the extent the latter is
proportionate to all other substantive rights and interests involved. In the course of
deciding the lawfulness of a regulatory measure vis-à-vis an investor, if
proportionality analysis stops at the second step, the investor's rights and interests
would be largely jeopardized in relation to an insignificant public interest.461

Against what some commentators have suggested that proportionality analysis
responds to the imbalance BITs, I rather submit that proportionality responds to the
unrestrained law-making of investment treaty tribunals.462 Further, I argue that the
proportionality test has an advantage over other deferential standards of review, since
it requires the adjudicator not only to consider the reasonableness of the governmental
measure ipso facto, but also to go farther in assessing the proportionality of the public
purpose objectives to the substance of the affected rights. In that capacity, it aims at
providing a legal interpretation of treaty terms in cases of conflict between competing
rights and interests of foreign investors on the one hand, and host states on the
other.463 Undoubtedly, the tribunal must stick to the conceptual framework of the BIT
while interpreting treaty terms using customary rules of treaty interpretation.
However, investment treaty tribunals may consequently have recourse to
proportionality analysis to investigate whether the challenged state measure is
consistent with the governing legal framework under a given BIT. Therefore, by
making use of proportionality analysis, tribunals are not second-guessing the
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relevance of host states regulatory measure to public interest, nor do they reinterpret
BITs provisions on the substantive rights of the parties. It is already settled that the
treaty parties have given arbitral tribunals the onus to review and correct their own
public conduct vis-à-vis prospective investors.464

V.

CONCLUSION

It is imperative for the purpose of this thesis not to confuse the ICSID's unique private
model of dispute settlement with the public law foundation of ITA. Since the latter
essentially emanates from a state sovereign power as a subject of international law.
Through its consent to the ICSID jurisdiction, a state willingly refers its regulatory
disputes with individual investors to an alternative dispute settlement to its domestic
court system. In that sense, host states delegate their law-making power to one-off
investment treaty tribunals. The logical corollary of understanding ITA as public law
adjudication is that public law concepts most notably sovereign independence, nonintervention and administrative discretion have to be duly observed in both
jurisdiction and merits of investor-state disputes. Despite the fact that B/MITs are
subject to relative bargain power, term variations and individual limitations,
investment treaty tribunals have wide discretionary power through the process of
interpretation. If there is a gap in an investment treaty, the competent tribunal fills it
in through the back-door of interpretation. From an international law perspective,
investment treaty tribunals are bound by the customary rules of international law
applicable to investment disputes. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lays
down the legal basis for interpreting the substantive rights of treaty parties in an
international context. I maintain that this interpretive approach is indispensable to
reconceptualise the host states' right to economic development as intended by the
drafters of the Washington Convention. Furthermore, such an approach would allow
arbitral tribunals, in so far as treaty terms so apply, to integrate rules on corporate
social responsibility vis-à-vis the host state. International minimum standards of
investment protection cannot be applied in isolation from corporate compliance with
national legal rules applicable to investment. It is the duty of investment treaty
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tribunals to consider these rules provided that they are consistent with general
international law. I submit that a public law approach to investment tribunals' lawmaking process would help map out a predictable space for the host state in its
exercise of regulatory powers in areas of public policy concerns such as health,
environment, human rights, finance and taxation.

Investment treaty tribunals must not interpret international minimum standards in a
legal vacuum; rather they have to resort to the concept of sources of international law
as provided by article (38) of the ICJ statute. In the event treaty terms run out of a
legal solution, arbitral tribunals may appeal to customary rules of international law. I
argue that the integration of new sources of international law into investment treaty
tribunals' law-making would help define the open-ended substantive standards of
investment protection. Yet, this entails disentangling the debate that underlies the
different sources of international law in order to determine the substantive principles
applicable to a given investor-state dispute. This process requires a comparative
qualitative analysis of context-related legal principles in both civil and common law
traditions whether at the domestic or international level. I believe that the on-going
semantic transformation of BITs would allow for a more nuanced understanding of
comparative public law standards of review in international investment law. Drawing
on the regulatory nature of ITA, I argue that accommodating the principle of
proportionality as a general principle of law into investment treaty tribunal lawmaking would help inform the definition of indirect expropriation, delineate the
boundary between compensatory expropriation and non-compensatory regulation and
consequently account for the host state's right to pursue public policy objectives.
Finally, I contend that developing comparative methods in ITA not only enables
investment treaty tribunals' to resolve interpretational conflicts between competing
rights and interests of foreign investors and states, but also marks an invaluable
opportunity for international arbitrators to save the legitimacy of the ICSID at large.
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